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ABSTRACT

Various resource-allocation schemes that have been identified in the distributive
justice literature were examined in peoples’ resource-allocation behavior. While resource
allocators must operate within the constraints of available resources, they can employ
allocation schemes defined by various definitions of fairness. Individuals and 3-person
groups solved a 3-dimensional resource-allocation problem, which was placed in the
context o f 3 different resource-allocation scenarios corresponding to the principles of
distributive justice (i.e., equity, equality, and need). Individual members o f a separate
treatment group took on different perspectives that corresponded to 3 alternatives. Results
indicated that resource allocators have a tendency to make distributive decisions based on
their perceptions of fairness derived from the embedded resource-allocation context of
the resource-allocation problem.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN RESOURCE-ALLOCATION

INTRODUCTION
Whether distributing funds among favorite charities, finding time for both work
and leisure, or dividing attention among children, people allocate their resources based on
what they can afford and how they are able to manage the complexity of the resourceallocation situation. Some resource-allocation decisions that pervade everyday life are
made effortlessly, while consequential decisions demand thorough inspection of the
problem and contextual factors. The primary yet complex challenge of resourceallocation problems is the selection among alternatives that are similarly desirable and
viable. For each selection, resource allocators must carefully evaluate the alternatives to
make decisions appropriate to the situation. Resource allocators must also consider
inevitable resource constraints that can limit what they want to achieve. The
sophistication of these tasks makes evident that the study o f resource-allocation behavior
is complex and difficult.
Psychological issues manifested in resource-allocation behavior have been
explored when resource changes and fluctuations occur (Ball, Langholtz, Sopchak, &
Auble, 1998; Langholtz, Gettys, & Foote, 1993, 1994, 1995), when individuals and
groups make decisions (Gonzalez, 2001), and when social relationships are integrated
into the context o f the problem (Marty, 2001). Components of the problem,
characteristics of the decision makers, and situational contexts are fundamental elements
of resource-allocation decisions. However, in resource-allocation research, these
fundamental elements have not been addressed simultaneously. While these essential
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aspects compound the difficulty for isolating strategies used for problem solving or
optimal decision making (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson, 1993), they are realistically
manifested together in concert. A complete understanding of resource-allocation behavior
might be better fostered if aspects of the problem structure, decision maker, and situation
were integrated in one experiment (as it is in the real world). This thesis will present
resource-allocation behavior in three major components. Part one will be a discussion of
resource-allocation situations where various resource-allocation schemes derived from
three distributive justice principles can be employed. Part two will be a discussion of
resource allocator types and people who are affected by their decisions. Part three will be
a discussion of the generalities resource-allocation behavior, previous resource-allocation
literature, and a three-dimensional resource-allocation problem that was provided to
participants in the present study.
Circumstances Surrounding Resource-Allocation Decisions
Decisions are governed by countless factors, some of which are completely
relevant to the decision-making task and some o f which are more peripheral than
essential. The obvious initial step o f the resource-allocation process is to evaluate the
resources that are to be distributed. Encased in a set of circumstances, resource-allocation
problems are generally defined in terms of resource amounts, availability, and resource
constraints. Resource allocators must gather as much information about the availability of
resources. How much do they have? Is there likelihood that they might lose resources
over time? If they are susceptible to a loss, how much of a loss might they encounter? Is
there a possibility to gain resources? While fluctuations in resources might occur,
sometimes the probabilities of the changes are known and therefore can be anticipated.
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Even with the knowledge o f resource amounts, forewarning o f fluctuations, and
resource constraints, resource-allocation problems might seem daunting to assess
mathematically without the help o f normative techniques (i.e., Linear or Integer
Programming) that will allow the resource allocator to obtain one or more optimal
solutions. However, when faced with a resource-allocation decision, people do not
normally have a resource-allocation handbook at hand. While optimal solutions are not
readily accessible to someone naive to normative models for solving resource-allocation
problems, resource-allocation problems appear to come intuitively nonetheless. Whether
budgeting money and time for food or deciding if it is “movie” or “bowling” night, tasks
requiring the allocation o f resources are ubiquitous and occur in familiar situations.
Contextual factors embedded in the resource-allocation experience guide
allocation decisions. The resource-allocation situation might set up the problem in
qualitative, rather than quantitative terms. While allocation procedures involve the
computation of resources, resource-allocation behavior must be interpretable, and the
situation must facilitate the explanation for distribution outcomes. These contextual
factors might be peripheral to resource-allocation proper but are necessary to examine in
order to secure a fuller understanding of resource-allocation behavior.
Before engaging in the resource-allocation process, resource allocators must
consider all the possible ways to interpret the resource-allocation situation. Resource
allocators might have to sift through superfluous information found in the context but can
ask some key questions: Who is affected by the resource-allocation decision? How
should resources be distributed in a fair manner? What are the consequences o f a faulty
decision? A whole host of situations, interpretations, and perspectives can be components
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o f the resource-allocation landscape, and perhaps the number o f plausible settings is
infinite. The resource-allocation situation is very broad to address as a general concept.
There are many kinds of resource-allocation situations that are part o f daily routines,
many occupations, and academic study. For the purposes of this thesis, the focus will be
on the examination of resource-allocation situations where the distribution o f resources
can potentially be made in several ways and in a fair manner.
Choosing an allocation scheme involves decision making based on the desired
(and fair) distribution outcome of resources. For a resource allocator, the desired optimal
solution might not be known, but he or she might have a notion about how resources can
be distributed in a fair manner. Based on this judgment, the resource allocator is
essentially determining what distribution outcome is “just,” hence making decisions
based on distributive justice.
Matters concerning distributive justice involve the provision of fair judgment. But
what is fair? Because the fairness concept is subjective, distributive justice judgments
might differ from one person to the next or from one situation to the next. Making a
generalization that one allocation scheme is appropriate for every person and for every
resource-allocation situation would be presumptuous and shortsighted. However, certain
aspects of resource-allocation situations (or the information regarding these situations)
might signal a resource allocator to distribute resources in a particular fashion.
Establishing fairness norms in resource-allocation situations. One o f the key
concerns o f resource-allocation research is to determine how allocators approach a
resource-allocation problem and justify distributive outcomes as fair. One of the leading
theoretical frameworks for distributive justice was initiated by Deutsch (1975). His
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conceptualization o f distributive justice was defined as the distribution o f conditions or
goods that affect the well-being o f a recipient (a) by the values underlying the primary
rules of distribution, (b) by rules that represent the values, (c) by the implementation of
rules, or (d) by the decision-making procedures. In sum, people do not always share the
same values. Consequently, disparate values among providers lead to disagreement about
how rules should be implemented, or even accepted at all.
Matters concerning distributive justice involve the provision of fair judgments.
Fairness is an important consideration when making decisions but is also subject to
interpretation o f the problem (Harris & Joyce, 1980) and the social context (Leventhal,
1980). Distributive justice is involved with the perceived fairness o f an allocation
decision, not only by the resource provider but also by the recipient (both are actors in a
resource-allocation situation that I will explain here). Resource providers examine the
criteria o f fairness before they make decisions. They have the privilege, responsibility,
and authority to make resource-allocation and distribution decisions to others. Their
decisions affect others, including the agency or organization they might represent and
(perhaps more significantly) the resource recipient. It is important for the resource
provider to consider fair distributions based on conditions o f the resource recipients and
the resource-allocation situation. Resource recipients assess the fairness according to the
decision outcome.
The criteria for obtaining fairness outcomes are tangled in the distributive justice
situation but represent independent perspectives o f the provider and recipient. For
example, a single mother must schedule her day so that she can meet the needs o f her
three children, ages 2, 10, and 12. Today is the 12-year-old’s birthday, and he was
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promised a birthday celebration this evening. Tonight, however, the 10-year-old has a
piano recital. The decision to attend one event (and not the other) is a benefit that one
child experiences but is a disappointment of another child. Moreover, the mother has a
toddler on her hands. The scheduling complications are obvious because the
consequences (i.e., discontentment, disappointment, and temper tantrums) can be
detriments to decision-making if her children feel that they are recipients o f an unfair
decision. Therefore, decision makers such as the mother must anticipate possible
reactions before dictating allocations.
When forecasting possible outcomes, resource providers predict reactions to and
consequences of their decisions. Needs, wants, beliefs, and prior expectations are a few
among a multitude o f factors that validate fairness judgments when comparing possible
outcomes (Bazerman, White and Loewenstein, 1995). Distribution outcomes are expected
to favor the welfare o f recipients as a whole (Deutsch, 1975); however, some research has
demonstrated that outcomes actually favor a self-serving direction (Pepitone, 1971). This
bias reflects interpersonal transactions that occur when making fairness judgments as
well as the effect o f multiple comparisons o f possible decision outcomes as compared to
a one-time evaluation. Bazerman et al. (1995) conducted research on potential fairness
outcomes presented in isolation and outcomes presented among other possibilities.
Fairness norms were justified if outcomes were presented in isolation, in that people
tended to prefer interpersonal comparison of outcomes over the maximization o f personal
gain when judging the fairness of the situation. However, when multiple outcomes were
presented together, people were less concerned with the comparative payoff and more

concerned with maximizing their own payoff (i.e., maximizing benefits and minimizing
burdens).
Resource-allocation decisions may involve an exchange of benefits (e.g., rewards
and gains) and burdens (e.g., costs and deprivation) within an interpersonal social sphere
or exchange. Because one’s benefits can be another’s burdens, the resource provider must
negotiate perspectives of the recipients and resolve unbalanced conditions (Ohtsubo &
Kameda, 1998). The provider has control over what is deemed unbalanced or unfair;
however, the needs o f recipients can entreat providers to make distributive decisions in
their favor (Skitka & Tetlock, 1992). Despite any persuasion involved, providers must
approach the resource-allocation problem in an unbiased manner according to a moral
code of conduct and in order to maintain integrity in their decisions (Lemer, 1991).
Impartial decision-making is an exercise of reaching settlements that are
acceptable to the parties involved. In the interest of fair outcomes, resource providers
evaluate the contributions and needs of those receiving benefits, and they assess the
deservingness and inadequacies of those receiving burdens (Sondak, Neale and Pinkley,
1995). On the other end, recipients with the intention to obtain benefits must demonstrate
merit, whereas other recipients that will inevitably receive burdens must assert their
entitlement for fair outcomes. Distributive justice research has examined the effects of
benefits and burdens in separate contexts. However, the discrete valences o f these
conditions do not necessitate independent research questions. In the present research,
benefits and burdens can be conceptualized as tradeoffs in terms of a social exchange.
Some issues o f distributive justice are concerned with one’s relative standing with
another person (Adams, 1965; Homans, 1961). How does the minority student feel when
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he is not accepted into his top-choice school? How does the female executive feel when
she does not get the job promotion? With respect to each situation, perhaps in actuality,
there were candidates more suitable for the educational institution or job position; or
perhaps the student and executive were victims o f injustice. When comparative
judgments show unbalanced conditions between two parties who are equally entitled for
something (e.g., admission or promotion), the perception of injustice can be a source of
conflict (Deutsch, 2000). Moreover, the recipient’s feeling o f injustice might bring about
consequences that the decision maker must face. Injustice can result in temporary
disappointment of an individual, or it can incite anger, or even bring about a lawsuit.
Distributive outcomes not only have a bearing on the recipient, but also on the decision
maker. Thus, the resource allocator must consider his or her values of justice and fairness
when making decisions.
According to Deutsch (1975), the concern for both individual well-being and
societal functioning underlies the values involved injustice. These values operate in
social environments that effectively promote the welfare o f and cooperation among the
group’s members. When the groups cooperate, individual interests are met and the group
achieves satisfaction with the decision among its members. This satisfaction, as
expressed by the perceived fairness of the decision, indicates that justice was served
(Gilliland, 1993). Therefore, individuals that compose the group must each ascribe to
values set forth by the social circumstances in order to have the same sense o f justice felt
among all group members (Wagstaff, Huggins & Perfect, 1993).
A range of distributive justice issues has been covered in the research literature,
from interactions on the interpersonal level (Wagstaff et al., 1993), in an organizational
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setting (Cropanzano, 2001), and on a grand societal scale (Miller, 1999). In the pursuit of
justice, people are compelled to make impartial and righteous judgments to satisfy social
concerns, to maintain business relationships, and to perform duties as a respectable
citizen. Although the situations are quite diverse, distributive justice concerns share a
common thread, in that three chief principles are characteristically employed when
making fairness judgments.
Deutsch (1975) observed three resource-allocation outcomes that have guided
most distributive justice lines in research: equity, equality, and need. These principles of
distributive justice are contingent upon the goals o f the resource providers and recipients
and serve as the basis for determining outcomes. When economic productivity is the
common goal, the principle of equity is employed. Many resource-allocation situations
involve the scarcity of resources, and therefore not everyone can receive resources
through the available means. There is a logical tendency to allocate resources in terms of
their economic functions; hence, the means that produce the highest return will be
employed to effectively utilize the scarce resource.
The principle of equity extends beyond a simple distribution of resources
according to their availability. Equity theories (Adams, 1966; Cohen, 1987; Walster,
Berscheid & Walster, 1973) are based on the idea that fair outcomes are determined by
how contribution or inputs (i.e., productivity) are deposited into the resource-allocation
system. The optimal distribution o f resources, therefore, is contingent upon the relative
standing of resource recipients in terms o f their efforts and contributions to the system
(Boldero & Rosenthal, 1984; Surazska, 1986). Alternatively, fairness outcomes can be
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conceptualized in terms o f deservingness (Cropazano, 2001). There has been much
debate over what the best formula for equity is (Walster et al., 1973).
Theories o f equity are not readily applicable to all decisions involving resourceallocation productivity, however. Contributions and inputs are sometimes irrelevant to the
allocation situation. In some resource-allocation situations, resource recipients are not
contributors to the resource-allocation system, and therefore these resource providers
have no basis to make distribution decisions. In these types of resource-allocation
situations, the maximization o f resources might be the goal of the resource allocator.
People who work in logistics and transportation, for example, transport goods from
warehouses to store locations according to scheduling and geographical conveniences.
The store locations themselves do not contribute anything to this particular resourceallocation system; therefore, the input dimension of equity is not applicable to all
situations involving productivity or expediency. Sometimes resources, if unclaimed or
never utilized, are lost and cannot be saved for later usage. Psychologically to a resource
allocator, the inability to fully utilize all resources might indicate that he or she is
inefficient or misused the privilege o f making distribution decisions.
Equity allocations in social systems, however, might undermine the mutual goal
o f relationship maintenance. Resource recipients must sometimes compete for the
resources. Thus, the resource provider must provide allocation schemes that will “keep
the peace” among resource recipients. When fostering positive social relationships is the
main goal o f the provider, resources will be allocated evenly among recipients, and the
equality principle is employed (Deutsch, 1975). Equal division and distribution of
resources is standard behavior when resources are shared among groups, particularly in
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social dilemmas (Allison & Messick, 1990; Allison, McQueen, & Schaerfl, 1992;
Samuelson & Allison, 1994).
While equal division of resources has been considered an acceptable social norm
in the research literature, Samuelson and Allison (1994) suggested that this practice is a
function of cognitive mechanisms of individuals and can be regarded as an equality
heuristic. Equality, in comparison to other allocation schemes, seems to be the easiest and
fairest way to obtain a satisfying outcome (Harris & Joyce, 1980). The convenience of
equality facilitates the use o f heuristics, particularly when all parties favor balanced
outcomes in social decision-making or in cooperative environments (Messick, 1995). One
might consider a very simple example: How might a pizza be divided among those at a
four-person table? The obvious answer: cut the pizza into four slices. If the pizza were
cut into six slices, two people will get one extra slice each, and this distribution would not
be fair to the other two people at the table. The principle of equality is not only an easy
solution, but equality can also maintain social harmony among a group of hungry pizzalovers. On a more profound level, the principle o f equality is applied in today’s society
when we consider issues such as civil rights and employment opportunities. While
equality is employed when cultivating cooperative relations and maintaining civil
relationships, considerations based on need are sometimes suitable approaches for
making distribution decisions in cooperative environments.
When resource providers want to implement distribution decisions to promote
personal development or personal welfare among resource recipients, the allocation of
resources might operate according to the needs o f its recipients (Deutsch, 1975). Most of
the distributive justice literature has concentrated on equity and equality (Adams, 1965;
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Leventhal, 1976). Research on the distribution norm of need has been modest since its
appearance in Deutsch’s (1975) literature (cf. Mannix, Neale, & Northcraft, 1995; Skitka
& Tetlock, 1992). The allocation of aid (e.g., social security or healthcare) is contingent
on the provider’s perceived deservingness of the recipient. When resources are scarce,
providers tend to use their authority to deny aid to claimants responsible for their
predicament (Skitka & Tetlock, 1992). Overall, the severity of need and responsibility
for poor conditions must be considered in the allocation of aid.
The principles of distributive justice (i.e., equity, equality, and need) do not
always surface as distinct or separate allocation approaches; therefore the appropriate
allocation procedure can be ambiguous (Deutsch, 1975; Leventhal, 1976). Often the
application of these principles can contradict one another, depending on how one might
view the situation (Elliott & Meeker, 1986; Harris & Joyce, 1980). Conflict can arise
among groups of resource allocators if they disagree on which distribution norm should
be applied (Deutsch, 2000). In contrast, a confluence might exist between two or more of
the principles o f distributive justice in many resource-allocation contexts, in which
allocators may try to adjust their distribution scheme (Greenberg, 1983). The coexistence
o f goals regarding interests in economic productivity, positive social relationships, and
personal welfare can, unfortunately, lead to greater difficulty in reaching decisions
(Mannix et al., 1995). To employ the appropriate allocation procedure, goals must be
explicit and values must be assessed to determine fair outcomes (Harris & Joyce, 1980;
Slade, 1980). While the evaluation of goals and values of the situation is a crucial
component to decision-making and resource-allocation, it has been a neglected aspect in
the study of resource-allocation behavior.
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As a basis for making distributive decisions, values are central to the evaluation of
justice or injustice, because the perceived values of conditions and goods vary from
person to person. Deutsch (1975) identified eleven values that underlie distributive
justice, and many o f these values map onto the framework of the present resourceallocation examination. These values (selected from Deutsch, 1975) are determined by
treating people (a) as equals, (b) according to the requirements of the common good, (c)
according to supply and demand, (d) so that they have equal opportunity to compete
without external favoritism or discrimination, and (e) according to their needs. Contexts,
such as economic, relationship, and personal development orientations, can provide cues
for assessing values that determine allocation rules for the distribution o f resources
(Mannix et al., 1995).
While situational and contextual aspects in the distributive justice literature have
been investigated (Mannix et al., 1995), specific aspects of the resource-allocation
situation have not been an explored area in resource-allocation behavior. Resourceallocation researchers have examined differences between types o f resource-allocation
tasks. For example, resource-allocation behavior has been examined in technical tasks
(Langholtz et al., 1993, 1994, 1995) and in commonplace tasks (Ball et al., 1998;
Langholtz et al., 1997). Langholtz et al. (1997) found that there were no significant
differences in performance between either types o f the resource-allocation task.
Differences in resource-allocation behavior, however, might be explained when various
interpretations of the resource-allocation situation are presented. When distributive
justice principles are adapted to the task and situation, it is expected that resourceallocation behavior will reflect various interpretations of distributive justice in the
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resource-allocation situation. The implementation o f the principles o f distributive justice,
therefore, might be a useful tool for interpreting resource-allocation behavior.
Resource-Allocation Decision Makers: The Providers
What do policy makers, finance committees, and parents have in common? They
are groups o f providers who establish the allocation rules for the distribution of resources.
Determining which distributive justice principle to employ is difficult enough for
individuals, but in groups, the task might become even more complicated if there are
different ways o f assessing the resource-allocation situation. Resource allocators,
particularly in groups, might disagree on the importance o f information provided;
therefore, choosing allocation schemes can be difficult (Elliott & Meeker, 1986). In
distribution decision-making, the outcomes can be attributed to the situation; however,
allocation preferences and characteristics of the provider is another research question to
consider.
As individuals or in groups, resource providers or resource allocators must
consider whom their decisions affect. Under most circumstances, resource-allocation
decisions influence the welfare of the resource recipients. Especially when conditions are
legitimately grim or severe, resource providers who have the authority to make decisions
are essentially responsible for the well-being o f all possible recipients. Characteristics of
the provider can be a predictor of how providers use their authority to determine
distribution outcomes. In Skitka and Tetlock’s (1992) study, for example, individual
providers were characterized as either politically conservative or liberal. The politically
conservative allocators withheld resources for claimants who were responsible for their
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predicament, regardless o f the severity o f need and resource availability. Liberal
allocators, on the other hand, were inclined to provide resources to all claimants.
Since distribution outcomes can be attributed to certain characteristics of the
provider, distribution outcomes might also be attributed to preferences o f the provider.
Having a preference, or inclination to choose one option over another, may depend on a
multitude o f factors (Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic, 1998). The inclination toward a
particular alternative influences an individual’s goal development and effort to achieve
goals (Jansson, 1994; Slade, 1994). When two people have differing preferences or
advocate a certain set of rules, the incompatibility of goals can affect the behavior of
decision makers. Particularly when providers are in groups, members might hold
different assumptions and employ different criteria to evaluate the situation (Tjosvold,
1988). Preferences for making distributive rules might be in conflict and goals might
have to be adjusted. On an interpersonal level, people attempt to resolve conflicting goals
by modifying goals to act in a cooperative manner (Slade, 1994). However, if individual
goals and group goals are compatible, the task itself will be the focus o f group discussion
and will be facilitated through cooperation (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).
Group resource-allocation behavior. Group processes are mutable and can be
modified as the group attempts to attain group goals. Ellis & Fisher (1994) identified four
elements inherent in group processes. First, the group must take action on a problem or
task. Second, processes occur on a continuum and change over time. Third, the group
makes advancements and progress over time. Fourth, processes lead to a goal or end
result. Similarly, resource-allocation behavior can be observed in terms of these elements
for group processes. Resource allocators are provided with a context in which the task is
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embedded. The task involves allocation procedures that occur over the course o f a fixed
time period in which decisions build upon each other to reach a final solution. Resource
providers evaluate the solution to determine whether the goal of obtaining an optimal
solution was achieved.
It would go beyond the scope of the present study, however, to examine specific
group decision-making processes (e.g., social decision schemes, etc.) involved when
providers determine which distribution rule to use. Distributive justice has not been
investigated in the form of resource-allocation behavior in either individuals or groups.
Therefore, it would be the foremost interest to examine the general performance and
behavior of the providers before examining the group processes involved. Moreover,
comparisons in allocation behavior must be distinguished between individual and group
resource providers before examining group processes. The focus on group resourceallocation behavior is still in its early stages. Gonzalez (2001) initiated this line of
research and found that group performance was superior to individual performance. This
M.A. thesis study involved a replication of an experiment by Langholtz et al. (1993) and
is the only experiment conducted on the topic of group resource-allocation behavior. One
o f the objectives of the present study is to verify that groups perform better than
individuals do when faced with a resource-allocation problem.
Individual members taking on different perspectives in groups. Researchers of
distributive justice have examined the perceived fairness of outcomes from either the
provider’s perspective or from the recipient’s perspective. The present research study
differs from previous research on distributive justice in two ways. First, distributive
outcomes are determined either by individual resource providers or by a group of
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resource providers. When cognitive resources are pooled, group performance is better
than individual performance. The expectation that group performance will be superior to
individual performance is based on the results of Gonzalez (2001). Second, groups were
either objective resource providers or they took on various perspectives of the recipients’
conditions. Various perspective-taking might provoke disagreement or conflict that can
inhibit performance in a group (Hyder et al., 2000); therefore, groups with disagreeing
members are expected to demonstrate performance inferior to groups whose members
share the same perspective.
Resource-Allocation Problems
Observing Resource-Allocation Behavior. People are essentially veterans to
resource-allocation procedures because they make these decisions frequently; therefore,
the ubiquity of such decisions may go unnoticed (Langholtz, Ball, Sopchak, and Auble,
1997). Significantly incorporated in daily routines, resource-allocation decisions are
made with little hesitation, and people generally experience success with the task.
Research in resource-allocation behavior has demonstrated that these tasks are intuitive,
even if various approaches and strategies exist for solving resource-allocation problems
(Ball, Langholtz, Sopchak, and Auble, 1998).
When confronted with resource-allocation decisions, people perform close to
optimal level, as defined by the methods used to observe resource-allocation behavior.
Linear Programming (LP), a normative model for determining optimal solutions,
functions as an applicable method for solving resource-allocation problems and is wellestablished in the Operations Research literature (Dantzig, 1963). Various aspects of

19

resource-allocation, such as the precise combination of alternatives that maximize
payoffs, can be evaluated from the LP model.
The LP model quantifies payoffs and solutions on a continuous scale. Depending
on the resource-allocation task, payoffs can be represented in fractional form or in whole
units. In contrast to LP solutions, Integer Programming (IP) solutions are quantified on a
discrete scale. The type o f scale used to obtain solutions characterizes the difference
between LP and IP methods. Therefore, one distinction between LP and IP models is the
number o f possible solutions and optimal solutions. An infinite number of solutions and
one optimal solution are possible in LP problems, whereas the number o f solutions is
limited and numerous optimal solutions are possible in IP problems.
The means o f quantifying payoffs determine the method employed for solving
resource-allocation problems. For example, the LP approach can be used to determine the
maximization of family quality time because time can be measured in hours, minutes, and
even seconds. In contrast, the IP approach must be used when items, such as the number
of meals consumed in a week, are measured in discrete units (Ball et al., 1998; Langholtz
et al., 1997). Solutions are quantified by IP methods in the present study; although most
o f the initial resource-allocation research has used LP methods.
Linear and Integer Programming procedures were first instituted in many business
industries and sectors (e.g., Operations Research, Industrial Engineering, and
Management Science). However, without familiarity or experience using LP and IP
methods, the average person does not typically have training or reference materials
nearby to make optimal resource-allocation decisions.
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Linear and Integer Programming. Two approaches to linear and integer
programming (i.e., Simplex Method and graphical solution method) can be used to solve
resource-allocation problems. The Simplex Method is a mathematical algorithm in which
optimal LP solutions are determined mathematically. The Graphical Solution Method can
well-illustrate problems in two-dimensions and three-dimensions, in which resourceconstraint lines create boundaries for the feasible regions optimal LP and IP solutions are
determined. In two-dimensional resource-allocation problem, each dimension represents
a decision variable on the x- and y-axis. Resource constraints are represented by lines,
which determine the boundaries of the feasible region. Any point can be satisfied in this
feasible region. The “most attractive comer,” is a maximum point in the feasible region
that can be satisfied within the resource constraints and represents the optimal solution if
the goal of the resource allocator is to maximize payoff. Lapin (1981) provides a detailed
tutorial for using the graphical solution method to solve resource-allocation problems,
and Dantzig (1997) provides a more current LP reference tool.
Adding one more dimension to the two-dimensional resource-allocation problem
enhances its complexity. Figure 1 illustrates the increased sophistication o f the threedimensional resource-allocation problem. Where there were resource-constraint lines in a
two-dimensional problem, there are resource-constraint planes. Each dimension
represents a decision variable on the x-, y -, or z-axis. Resource-allocation research has not
yet extended beyond three-dimensional problems. While there are an infinite number of
dimensions possible in resource-allocation problems, the Simplex Method (rather than
the Graphical Solution Method) would be a more feasible to research behavior in
dimensions that go beyond three.
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Previous research in resource-allocation behavior. The study o f resourceallocation behavior is complex because it tackles the realities o f resource-allocation
decisions. Especially for naive decision makers, resource-allocation tasks appear to be
hefty undertakings. While many practices and applications have benefited from the
normative research literature for resource-allocation decisions in business and in
engineering settings, the psychological aspects o f managing mundane yet important
responsibilities, such as budgeting the family income or scheduling weekly appointments,
have not appeared in the resource-allocation literature until recently.
The study o f resource-allocation behavior originated with Gingrich and Soli
(1984), who presented participants with a realistic resource-allocation problem. They
were the first to integrate the LP method into the resource-allocation-behavior framework
by presenting participants with a two-dimensional, one-time resource-allocation task
under certainty. The participants identified their goals about physical fitness, performed a
cost-benefit analysis, and formulated their strategies to maximize goals. Given a specified
amount o f time and money, participants were directed to maximize payoffs (physical
fitness). Participants completed the task successfully; they attained at least 90% of the
optimal LP solution.
Busemeyer, Swenson, and Lazarte (1986) applied the hill-climbing method to
compare performance o f individuals to the optimal solution. Both methods can aptly
represent resource-allocation problems, but they differ in that the maximum payoff is
usually approachable from any direction in hill-climbing, while the optimal solution is
always on the boundaries of the feasible region in LP. Busemeyer et al. (1986) examined
participants’ learning in a resource-allocation problem when objectives were not initially
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specified. Overall, participants were able to achieve the maximum payoff when there was
one optimum but performed sub-optimally when there were multiple optima.
From the studies conducted by Gingrich and Soli (1984) and Busemyer et al.
(1986), Langholtz, Gettys, and Foote (1993, 1994, 1995) expanded the nascent research
in resource-allocation behavior by investigating the anticipation of changes and
fluctuations in resource availability, especially when resources are allocated over time.
Langholtz et al. (1993) utilized the LP method when they examined how people revised
resource-allocation strategies in reaction to situations of certainty (where resources do not
fluctuate over the course during a trial), risk (where the probabilities of gains or losses are
known), and uncertainty (where the probabilities o f gains or losses are not known) in an
environment. The task presented was a sequence o f eight four-day cycles, in which Coast
Guard members scheduled two helicopters that required different amounts of personnel
and fuel resources to fly. The goal o f task was to maximize the number of flight hours,
within the limited resources of personnel and fuel available.
In general, results indicated that people are satisfactory resource allocators when
faced with a two-dimensional resource-allocation problem. Participants obtained
solutions that were 80-90% o f the LP optimal solution. With practice in this task, many
scores improved to 95% o f the LP solution, even without prior experience with LP.
Reaching at least 90% o f the optimal LP solution after only three trials, participants
performed best under certainty as compared with those who were in the risk and
uncertainty conditions. Under risk, participants hovered around at least 75% of the
optimal LP solution but improved performance to at least 90% of the optimal LP solution
after many trials. Among all conditions, performance under uncertainty was the most
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deficient. Participants in an environment of uncertainty maintained performance around
85% o f the optimal LP solution across all eight trials. Overall, participants demonstrated
a proficiency in resource-allocation tasks, where environments under certainty were the
most conducive for success; environments under risk promoted learning; and
environments under uncertainty produced unpredictable behavior.
In many resource-allocation situations, vital resources are scarce and multiple
losses are possible. Resource-allocation behavior in these harsh environments was
examined by Langholtz et al. (1994). Participants were presented with two sequences of
eight three-day cycles in which members of the Coast Guard scheduled two patrol boats
with limited personnel and fuel and were instructed to sustain enough resources in order
to maintain operations until the end of the task. The goal of the task was to maximize the
number of underway operating hours, given a fixed amount o f personnel hours and
gallons o f fuel. Resource-allocation environments varied by the degree of harshness:
participants in the low difficulty (LD) condition, characterized as the benign
environment, were required to allocate a minimum patrol of 3.5 hours per day;
participants in the middle difficulty (MD) condition were required to allocate a minimum
patrol of 4.5 hours per day; and participants in the high difficulty (HD) condition,
characterized as the harshest environment, were required to allocate a minimum patrol of
5.5 hours per day. The difficulty o f the resource-allocation task further escalated as
participants experienced either zero, one, or two 6-hour personnel losses.
Overall, participants in the task conditions (i.e., LD, MD, and HD) obtained at
least 91% of the optimal LP solution. Participants obtained 89% o f the optimal LP
solution in the LD condition, 93% of the optimal LP solution in the MD condition, and
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92% o f the optimal solution in the HD condition. As minimum patrol requirements were
set higher, the environment presented participants with a greater challenge to survive the
task. High levels of difficulty and multiple losses throughout the task imposed the need to
carefully allocate resources. As expected by more stringent task demands, LD
participants completed 78% of the cycles on average, whereas the average cycles
completed by the MD and HD participants were 68% and 52%, respectively.
In loss situations, resource allocators did not plan for probable losses (Langholtz
et al., 1993; 1994). Rather, they completed the resource-allocation task in reaction to
losses. These findings prompted further investigation into situations in which the
possibility o f both gains and losses can occur (Langholtz, et al., 1995). Similar to the
resource-allocation task presented in Langholtz et al. (1994), the problem presented in
Langholtz et al. (1995) was used to replicate previous findings about loss situations as
well as generalize the failure to anticipate resource fluctuations by examining behavior in
gain situations.
According to the results o f the Langholtz et al. (1995) study, this generalization
can be made; participants prepared for neither gains nor losses. They did not pre-position
themselves to handle gain and loss situations and did not directly respond to changes or
fluctuations in resources. Instead, they delayed their reaction to gains and losses until the
final opportunity to allocate resources. While resource fluctuations impeded planning,
participants were able to achieve 90% o f the optimal LP solution in both gain and loss
situations. Across trials, performance was higher in gains as compared to losses;
however, this performance asymmetry was not attributed to the fundamental differences
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between gains and losses. Obtained solutions indicated that participants revealed a
tendency to schedule alternatives in equal proportion throughout the task.
While resource-allocation performance generally reveals the intuitive nature of
resource-allocation problems, Langholtz et al. (1993) uncovered a cognitive shortcut, or
equal-scheduling tendency, that can thwart the attainment o f optimal solutions. The
equal-scheduling tendency was consistently observed in subsequent resource-allocation
studies (Langholtz et al., 1994 and 1995), and its robustness was tested when different
structures o f the resource-allocation problem were presented to participants (Langholtz et
al., 1997).
Resource-allocation problems can be structured in various forms, depending on a
multitude of factors. In particular, the number of possible alternatives and the optimal
proportion of resources to be allocated are relevant features of resource-allocation
problems that can be used to classify problem structures. Langholtz et al. (1997)
incorporated both dimensionality and problem configurations to examine resourceallocation behavior. A commonplace resource-allocation problem modeled with Integer
Programming was presented to college students who were instructed to maximize the
number o f meals on a fixed budget over a seven-day period. Participants received an IP
problem illustrated in either two or three dimensions, where two or three alternatives
were possible. Participants given a two-dimensional problem received one of three
problem configurations: symmetrical, where each alternative needed to be scheduled
equally to research the optimal solution; skewed, where alternatives needed to be
scheduled in a two-thirds ratio; and all-or-nothing, where to reach the optimal solution
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only one alternative needed to be scheduled and the other alternative needed to be
ignored.
Solutions o f at least 80-90% o f the optimal IP solution were obtained, and
performance o f individuals who received a two-dimensional problem was similar to the
performance o f individuals who received a three-dimensional problem. Also consistent
among the task conditions was the tendency o f participants to schedule alternatives
equally, despite the different problem structures or configurations presented. These
results confirmed the existence and robustness of the equal-scheduling tendency. When
events or alternatives are distributed over a time series, resource allocators are not
cognizant of unique problem structures and maintain a propensity to arrange alternatives
in an equal distribution (Langholtz et al. 1997).
Subjective Values Might Influence Behavior. Two decision-making themes have
dominated most of resource-allocation research. First, when resources are scarce, proper
decision-making must be maintained when undertaking resource-allocation tasks to avoid
waste or squandering behavior. Second, when resource availability is unpredictable, the
same scrutiny o f the resource-allocation problem must be maintained. These themes only
take into consideration various properties o f resources. When resource-allocation tasks
are complex, resource allocators must tackle not only the resource-allocation problem,
but they also must absorb information from the scenario that is pertinent to the task.
While real-world scenarios can furnish a sensible context about the resource-allocation
situation, this contextual information is purely supplemental to the mathematical details
and is not necessarily required for determining the optimal LP or IP solution.
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Information that is solely pertinent to resource-allocation tasks includes the types
of resources, the amount o f resources available, the costs o f each alternative, and goals of
the task. Without these problem features, resource allocators cannot reach their objective
to maximize (or minimize, depending on the problem type) payoffs and resources.
Specifically under the IP framework, resource-allocation task objectives are represented
by the Objective Function (see Figure 2, Panel A). The Objective Function, expressed in
equation form, operates as a resource-allocation guide for communicating task goals (i.e.,
maximize the number of projects that can be implemented in one year). Given the
Objective Function or task goals, resource allocators should behave independently of any
information tangential to the problem itself.
However, resource-allocation problems do not occur in a vacuum. Contexts in
which resource-allocation decisions occur must be included with the presentation o f the
problem. Peripheral information incorporates attributes and utility o f the alternatives,
characteristics o f the decision maker, and general aspects of the situation. Background
knowledge about the task environment presents the resource allocator with a realistic,
germane context for the problem. Therefore, contexts in which resource-allocation events
occur are integrally connected to task performance and are therefore necessary for
studying and understanding behavior.
Just as the Objective Function serves as a guide to resource-allocation problems,
the Subjective Function can serve as a guide to manage in the resource-allocation
situation. One way to assess the resource-allocation situation is to consider the
“subjective” values assigned to each alternative or to the resources that will be spent.
Consider a person (a culinary student) who enjoys cooking and is willing to spend as
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much time and money it takes to prepare a gourmet meal; home-cooked meals are
preferred to meals at a restaurant. Consider another person who is constantly on-the-go;
time for this person might be a more valuable asset than money. Preferences for one
alternative versus another or valuing some resources more than others can affect how
resource-allocation decisions are made (refer to Panels B, C, and D in Figure 2). When
choosing the preferred alternative, sometimes limited resources go ignored, and people
go with impulses before prudently calculating the availability of resources. One thing is
in mind, and that is payoff.
Two pieces of resource-allocation research has distinguished the difference
between the two expressions o f objective function and subjective function. The M.A.
thesis of Nolan (2000) examined resource-allocation behavior when the slope of the
Objective Functions represented resource-allocation preferences. Participants were
presented a resource-allocation problem in which the slope o f the Objective Function was
either equal to -1, -2 or -3. Results o f this study indicated that participants did not make a
clear distinction among the various slopes of the objective function presented.
A specific type o f payoff, utility, can also determine how resource allocators’
goals are represented by Objective Functions. Marty (2001) presented the meal problem
to dyads composed of a Home Chef and a Restaurant Frequenter (refer to Ball et al., 1998
or Langholtz et al., 1997 for details o f the problem structure). Each dyad member differed
in meal preferences and utility received for home-cooked or restaurant meals. It was
found that dyads who received opposing Objective Functions performed better than
dyads who received the same Objective Function.
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Payoffs can also be determined based on subjective valuation by the resource
allocator. Resource allocators can develop subjective goals that extend beyond what is
expressed by the Objective Function. It is proposed in this thesis that subjective goals can
be distinguished from task goals in four ways in this thesis: First, subjective goals are
anchored in the resource-allocation situation and emerge from subjective information
provided by the scenario. Task goals, on the other hand, only pertain to resourceallocation problem factors. Second, subjective goals are deeply entrenched in the
resource-allocation situation, whereas task goals are overtly expressed in the task
instructions. Third, subjective goals can be represented by the Subjective Function, and
task goals can be represented by the Objective Function. Finally, subjective goals can be
different from task goals. The trajectory of the Subjective Function can differ from the
trajectory of the Objective Function.
Complex Situations Might Require Planning
Do resource allocators simply jump into the resource-allocation problem, or do
they think before they act? Cognitive strategies discovered by Ball et al. (1998) might
point to a certain quality o f spontaneity in resource-allocation decisions. The majority of
participants (79%) in Ball’s study were individuals who employed the Consume-andCheck (CAC) strategy, in which allocations were routinely varied throughout the task. In
contrast, 21% of the participants employed the Solve-and-Schedule (SAS) strategy, in
which the resource-allocation plan was established before the initial allocation. It is
possible to assume that individual participants might be more inclined to be vigilant when
making decisions and “check” resource availability as they go. However, this type of
behavior might pertain more to individuals than groups. More deliberation might be
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necessary for resource-allocation decisions in the present task than in the task presented
in Ball et al. for three reasons: First, subjective information in the scenario might require
more information processing of the resource-allocation situation in addition to the
objective information of the resources. Second, the complexity of the present resourceallocation task involves three dimensions, which is more difficult than the standard twodimensional problems that have appeared in most resource-allocation behavior literature.
Third, when groups perform resource-allocation tasks, prior communication is essential
before even the first transaction of resources.
Individual cognitive strategies found in Ball et al. (1998) may not be consistent
with the strategies that must be employed to perform at an optimal level in the present
experiment. When the task becomes more complex, more deliberation will be necessary
to allocate resources appropriately. Therefore, decision makers in the present study may
be more likely to employ the Solve-and-Schedule strategy (which requires a resource
distribution plan) than the Consume-and-Check strategy (which does not involve a plan).
Strategies for distributing resources in the present experiment will not be determined by
verbal protocols as they were in Ball et al.’s study. Rather, presumptions of the strategies
used are made, based on resource-allocation patterns that emerge or where there is
variability in behavior. If obvious patterns emerge, it can be assumed that participants
utilized the Solve-and-Schedule strategy. If patterns are varied or random, it can be
assumed that participants utilized the Consume-and-Check strategy.
Overview
In the present study, resource-allocation performance and behavior is investigated
from various perspectives of the resource-allocation situation. Principles of distributive
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justice (i.e., equality, equity, and need) are represented in the present resource-allocation
problem. The study will investigate to what degree people may distribute resources
according to the social norms demanded by contextual information provided in three
scenarios Equity, Equality, and Need. Since various perspectives of the resourceallocation situation are possible, characteristics of the resource allocators (i.e., individuals
vs. groups, advocacy groups vs. neutral agency) are used to determine differences in
decision-making by various agencies. The present study will investigate whether or not
the bigger arsenal o f cognitive resources that groups have compared to individuals will
influence groups to perform better than individuals in resource-allocation tasks.
Furthermore, groups and individuals are expected to attack resource-allocation tasks
differently, where groups will use more SAS than CAC strategies. When personal stakes
are at risk, groups comprised of individuals advocating divergent views are hypothesized
to be inhibited by conflict, demonstrate the equal-scheduling tendency, and therefore
perform at lower levels than groups comprised of members taking neutral perspectives.

METHOD
Participants played the roles of members of the TEA Corps, a fictitious non-profit
organization that implements projects to aid three developing countries. The resourceallocation assignment was to utilize financial and personnel resources over the course of
one year, and the humanitarian mission was to determine fair distributions of projects that
accommodate the needs o f each country.
Participants
Introductory psychology students at the College o f William and Mary participated
in the present study as part of a course requirement. The sample consisted o f 150
participants who did not report previous experience in solving resource-allocation
problems. Experimental conditions were based on scenarios provided on an interactive
computer, and participants performed the resource-allocation task either as a three-person
group or as individuals.
Apparatus
Introductory screens displayed on an interactive computer provided participants
with instructions for performing the resource-allocation task. Each introductory scenario
provided the context of the resource-allocation problem and presented the starting
amounts of resources, the financial and personnel resources required for the
implementation of each project, and the monthly project constraints. Following each
monthly implementation decision, the screen displayed calculations of the number of
projects allocated, the total of resources consumed, and the amount o f resources
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remaining in the year. Participants had the opportunity to evaluate their performance at
the end of each year, when the computer screen displayed the summary o f resource
consumption and project implementation. Allocations were expunged at the end of each
year, and computer program refreshed the resources to initial amounts for each trial.
Procedure
Participants played the roles of Project Directors for the TEA Corps, a mock non
profit organization that provides support for three developing countries— Tech Republic,
Educaland, and Agraria—that require development in the areas of technology, education,
and agriculture, respectively. Each participant read scenarios explicitly conveying the
goal o f the task: to maximize the number of projects possible to implement in one year
when provided with a budget of $192,000 and 720 TEA Corps volunteers. Participants
were not told with the optimal number of projects attainable, which was an IP solution
totaling to 33 projects in the present resource-allocation problem.
Participants were told that at the beginning o f each month, the TEA Corps
implements new projects and complete these projects by the end o f each month. As TEA
Corps Project Directors, participants were given the opportunity each month to choose
the location for project implementation and were provided with information about each
project type with regard to each country’s needs: technological projects provide the Tech
Republic with computers, healthcare, and industry equipment; educational projects
provide Educaland with the building o f schoolhouses, teaching materials, and books;
agricultural projects provide Agraria with planting crops, irrigation, and equipment.
Among the project alternatives, technological projects required the most money but
fewest volunteers; educational projects required intermediate amounts o f money and
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volunteers; and agricultural projects required the least amount of money but most
volunteers to implement.
To ensure that resources were not consumed too early or excessively conserved
throughout the year, project constraints were given to the participants. They were told
that a minimum of one project and a maximum of five projects (any combination of the
three countries) would be implemented each month. Finally, participants were directed to
take the perspective consistent with the scenario provided.
Scenarios
While resource-allocation practices are found in various occupations and daily
activities, they are usually so integrated into life’s routines that cognitive procedures
employed in resource-allocation tasks can be difficult to isolate in research. To facilitate
the study of resource-allocation behavior, scenarios must be precisely crafted to convey
the general context and unique circumstances embedded in the resource-allocation
situation. Scenarios must be realistic enough for participants to understand the specifics
of the resource-allocation problem, yet they need to be plausible and detailed enough for
participants to identify with subjective aspects o f the resource-allocation situation. To
observe differences in behavior and performance among various resource-allocation
situations, scenarios must be constructed so that they resonate with different takes or
perspectives o f the same resource-allocation problem presented. Resource allocators may
not always see eye-to-eye when it comes to fairness judgments. Therefore, individuals
with differing perceptions of fairness of the situation will be likely be diminished if a
distribution norm is established (Mannix & White, 1992) and if qualitative distinctions of
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the information is made available (Elliott & Meeker, 1986). The scenarios in their
entirety are in the Appendix, but summaries of each scenario follow.
Equity Scenario. From an organization’s perspective, economic productivity is
one of the chief interests of the TEA Corps. Equity decisions are vital to this
organization, and the importance of these types of decisions is promoted in this scenario.
As a non-profit organization, the TEA Corps is not interested in profit; however, the
Project Directors were charged with the responsibility to maximize the resources given
each year. Participants were instructed to allocate resources in accordance with the
business strategy o f the TEA Corps organization. While the specific needs o f each
country were acknowledged in this scenario, participants were instructed to consider each
country in the same regard. Further, participants were told that their decisions were to be
based strictly on the costs of each project and available resources.
Equality Scenario. The TEA Corps generously offers projects to three countries:
the Tech Republic, Educaland, and Agraria. To improve current conditions in each of
these countries, the TEA Corps strives to adhere to the mission of providing them with as
many project opportunities as possible. To maintain integrity as a nonpartisan
organization, Project Directors were encouraged to view each country’s need as
legitimate and equally favorable. Instructed to maximize the implementation of projects,
participants were also instructed to address the predicament of each country and to
provide benefits to all three countries.
Need Scenario. As humanitarians and as part of an organization that provides aid
for needy countries, TEA Corps Project Directors must be sensitive to the problems that
developing countries face. Despite the justifiable needs o f the Tech Republic and
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Educaland, this scenario favored the perspective o f the poorest country, Agraria. With the
authority to respond to this impoverished country, Project Directors were given the
opportunity to fulfill the moral obligation of assisting the campaign to end Agraria’s
famine. To this end, projects implemented in Agraria supplied the country with
agricultural capabilities to provide its citizens with food. Participants who were given
this scenario were faced with the dilemma either to maximize total projects among all
three countries (the explicit goal of the task) or to address the desperate needs of Agraria.
Different perspectives scenario. Resource-allocation situations can be understood
from various perspectives. Individuals affiliated with a country demonstrate allegiance to
their nation, especially when in contention for scarce resources. In this scenario, citizens
from the Tech Republic, Educaland, and Agraria represented their homelands as TEA
Corps delegates. Acting as emissaries, participants were instructed to campaign for
project implementation in their respective country. As members of the TEA Corps project
committee, however, these representatives were told that they were accountable for
maximizing the number of projects implemented each year. Based on negotiations and
collaborative efforts, delegates were instructed to arrive at resource-allocation decisions
appropriate to the complex situation.
Experimental Design o f the Tasks
The primary goal o f the present study is to determine if resource-allocation
decisions and performance are solely based on the goal o f achieving a maximum with the
resource properties and structure of the resource-allocation problem or if the situational
variables bias distribution decisions. There were two parts to the present experiment.
First, a three-dimensional resource-allocation problem was presented to 120 participants.

37

O f these participants, 30 individuals and 30 three-person groups were divided into three
treatment groups that solved the problem in contexts specific to three distributive justice
principles (i.e., equity, equality, and need). In the present experiment, these contexts are
referred to as the Equity, Equality, and Need scenarios. Hence, resource-allocation
behavior and performance was examined using a 2 x 3 design in which groups were
compared to individuals with respect to each of the three distributive justice scenarios.
In the second part of the experiment, 10 groups were composed of three
individuals. Each individual in these three-person groups took on different perspectives
of the resource-allocation situation. Each perspective advocated the Tech Republic’s,
Educaland’s, or Agraria’s point-of-view. All participants solved the three-optioned
resource-allocation problem, which spanned 4 12-month years. Resource-allocation
behavior of the participants who received the Different Perspectives scenario will be
examined separately from the scenarios corresponding to the distributive justice
principles of equity, equality, and need. The investigation of resource-allocation behavior
in this scenario is for exploratory purposes.
In the analysis, a possibility of 50,400 data points can be included: 3 project
sources x 12 months x 5 possible projects per month x 4 years x 10 individuals x 3
scenarios = 21,600; 3 project sources x 12 months x 5 possible projects per month x 4
years x 10 groups x 3 scenarios = 21,600; 3 project sources x 12 months x 5 possible
projects per month x 4 years x 10 groups in the Different Perspectives Scenario = 7,200.
Three dimensional problem
Although participants were provided with scenarios that stressed different
perspectives on the situation, the same basic mathematical three-dimensional resource-
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allocation problem was presented to all participants. The dimensionality o f the resourceallocation problem takes its form from viable alternatives. Participants were given three
project alternatives in the areas o f technology, education, and agriculture, thus producing
a three-dimensional resource-allocation problem where Agraria represented the x-axis,
the Tech Republic represented they-axis, and Educaland represented the z-axis.
Resource-allocation behavior is bounded by resource constraints, which are structured as
planes in a three-dimensional space (see Figure 3).
TEA Corps project directors and delegates were provided with a yearly budget of
$192,000 and 720 volunteers. Allocations of these financial and personnel resources were
made each month for one year. Expenses required for the implementation of each project
alternative were given to the participants, and these requirements are shown in Table 2.
Given the resource specifications, participants allocated their financial and
personnel budgets to implement various combinations of projects within resourceconstraints. The money constraint can be expressed as: 192,000 > (8000T(x) + 4800£'(x)
+ 4000yf(x)}, where the numerical value to the left of the inequality represents the annual
financial budget, and the numerical values on the right side of the inequality represent the
money required to implement one project to the Tech Republic, Educaland, and Agraria
respectively. Identically structured, the volunteer constraint line can be expressed as: 720
> {15T(x) + 24E(x) + 30v4(x)}.
The total number of projects implemented each month was regulated by project
constraints. Participants were required to implement a minimum of one project and a
maximum of five projects each month, but any combination o f projects within these
constraints were attainable. While project constraints are not required by integer
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programming procedures, these restrictions were established to ensure that participants
operated within the scope of the resource-allocation problem, in that TEA Corps projects
were to be consistently implemented over the course of the year (not at one time). The
project constraint can be expressed as 1 < T(x) + E(x) + A{x) < 5, for x = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12, where x denotes the month of project implementation. In addition, a non
negativity requirement is imposed: 0 < T(x), E(x)yA(x). Participants were also given the
objective of maximizing the number of projects that can possibly be obtained in one year,
and this objective can be expressed by the following Objective Function equation:
12

Maximize p = X {T(x) + E(x) + A (x)j, where the variablep represents the maximum total
X

=

1

number of projects implemented in one year. This maximum of 33 may be obtained by
any one o f seven equally optimal solutions, (0, 8, 25); (0, 9, 24); (0, 10, 23); (1, 9, 23); (1,
10, 22); (2, 10, 21); and (2, 11, 20) found by the IP method (see Figure 4). T(x), E(x), and
A(x) represent the number of projects implemented for the Tech Republic, Educaland,
and Agraria on month x.
Defined by the subjective function, resource-allocation scenarios contained
persuasive arguments and steered participants toward different types o f goals (other than
simply maximizing the total number o f projects) (see Panels B, C, and D of Figure 5 for
each scenario presented). Participants that received the Equity scenario were instructed to
maximize resources of money and volunteers. To facilitate the maximization of
resources, the Equity scenario provided information regarding the number of resources
available and the expenses involved in implementing projects to the three countries. For
the complete utilization of all resources, the participant must implement exactly 32
projects: 16 for the Tech Republic, 16 for Agraria, and zero for Educaland. The
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Subjective Function of the Equity scenario is expressed here in terms of the number of
projects implemented in a year to obtain the Equity optimal solution of (16,16,0): 32 =
16T + X6E+0A.
The Equality scenario endorsed a cooperative environment, making the social
implications of TEA Corps decisions very salient to participants who were instructed to
regard each country as equivalent counterparts. To do so, the participant must implement
exactly 30 projects, 10 for each country, in on year. The Subjective Function of the
Equality scenario is expressed here in terms of the number of projects implemented in
one year to obtain the Equality optimal solution (10, 10, 10): 30 = 10T+ \0E + 10A.
Participants that received the Need scenario were provided with information
regarding the famine-affecting lives of Agrarian citizens, while no information regarding
the status of Educaland and the Tech Republic were described beyond their basic needs
(e.g., “Educaland needs help with schools”). For participants receiving the Need scenario,
12

their Subjective Function is expressed as Maximize a = X {A(x)}, where the variable a
JC= 1

represents the total number of Agrarian projects implemented in one year and a is
obtainable by the Need optimal solution, (24, 0, 0).
Participants received exclusive information about the country they “represented”
in the Different Perspectives scenario (see Figure 6). Each individual participant in the
three-person groups that received this scenario their advocated country’s own specific
needs. Therefore, the Subjective Function defines the separate perspectives given to each
group member. For the participant taking the Tech Republic’s perspective, his or her
12

Subjective Function is: Maximize t = £ {T(x)}, where the variable t represents the
x = l

maximum total number of Tech Republic projects implemented in one year, and where t
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is possible if the Tech Republic optimal solution, (0, 24, 0), is obtained. The Subjective
12

function for the participant taking Educaland’s perspective is: Maximize e = £ {E(x)},
X

=

1

where e represents the total number of Educaland projects possible to obtain the
Educaland optimal solution, (0, 0, 30). The advocate for Agraria had the Subjective
12

Function: Maximize a = £
X =

where a represents the total number of Agraria
1

projects at Agraria’s optimal solution, (24, 0, 0).

RESULTS
Resource-allocation Performance
Obtaining z* and Optimal Solutions. Participants were instructed to obtain their
goal for maximizing the number o f projects in one year while maintaining their
subjective goals respective of the resource-allocation situation they were given. By
maximizing the number o f possible TEA Corps projects, participants could obtain z*,
which represents 100% o f the optimal IP solution. Percentage o f z* denotes performance
and is calculated by dividing the number of projects obtained (endpoint at the conclusion
o f the twelfth month o f the year) by the maximum number of projects possible (z*), given
the resource constraints. Failure to maximize the number o f projects indicates that
performance was not optimal; therefore, any percentage less than 100% of z* (e.g., 90%
of z*) represents sub-optimal performance. The optimum LP solution is (0, 9.6, 24),
where x, y, and z are equal to the number of projects in Agraria, Tech Republic, and
Educaland, respectively. Since solutions cannot be in fractional form, LP solutions are
not used to compare performance. In the present resource-allocation problem, participants
could obtain 33 projects. Using the IP method, there were seven IP optimal discrete
solutions: (0, 8, 25); (0, 9, 24); (0, 10, 23); (1, 9, 23); (1, 10, 22); (2, 10, 21); and (2, 11,
20). These seven IP solutions illustrated in Figure 4 are the only solutions that can be
obtained in which 33 TEA Corps projects are implemented.
Fundamentally, the seven IP solutions are the normative solutions o f the resourceallocation problem. In the present resource-allocation problem, the attainment of any of
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the IP or normative solutions is an indication that the number of projects was maximized.
Provided with the goal to maximize projects in a specified direction, resource allocators
can obtain an optimal solution if that goal is fulfilled. For example, resource allocators
that have an explicit intention to distribute projects equally among recipients might do so
successfully, thereby obtaining the optimal solution designated for that goal. In sum, the
most favorable optimal solution is the measure by which goal achievement can be
observed.
Scenarios. The resource-allocation scenario determines how groups and
individuals will distribute projects and resources. Resource-allocation performance
differed significantly overall, depending on the resource-allocation scenario provided, F
(2, 234) = 3.136 ,p = .045. Participants who received the Equity scenario obtained 93% of
z* on average and performed better than participants who received other scenarios (see
Figure 7). Participants who received the Equality scenario obtained 92% o f z*, and those
who received the Need scenario obtained 91% of z*.
Also determined by z*, resource consumption can be an indicator o f conscientious
monitoring o f money and volunteers in the present study (see Figure 8). Overall, optimal
consumption rates for money differed with respect to the resource-allocation situation
provided, F (2, 234) = 8.759,p = .000, but consumption rates for volunteers did not differ
significantly according to scenarios.
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Groups vs. Individuals. Groups were compared to individuals on overall
performance, but no significant difference was found. Groups obtained 93% of z*, while
individuals obtained 92% z*.
Groups were compared to individuals on the consumption rate of money and
volunteers. Groups and individuals did not differ significantly on consumption rates of
either money or volunteers. Groups obtained 89% of z*, and individuals obtained 88% of
z* for money, F (1, 234) = 1.068, p = .305, and both groups and individuals obtained
98% o f z* for volunteers, F (l, 234) = .009, p = .924.
Learning. Over time and with practice, resource allocators can improve
performance by learning how to utilize resources and maximize projects each year. A
resource summary screen appeared at the end of each year, which gave participants an
opportunity to evaluate their choices and adjust their allocation schemes in order to reach
their goals. However, participants did not demonstrate performance-learning patterns
throughout the four years. They did not show a significant increase in the attainment of
the IP optimal solution. Participants learned how to better maximize money, F (3, 162) =
1.70, p <.05 (see Figure 9), but not volunteers over the four years that they implemented
projects.
Squandering Behavior
Resource allocators were given one year (i.e., 12 months) to implement as many
projects as possible using the resources available, with the stipulation that a minimum of
one project and a maximum of five projects were to be implemented each month. Any
combination of the three types of projects was possible. For example, resource allocators
could implement five projects to Educaland and zero projects to the other two countries.
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The minimum and maximum provisions were made so that participants would not be
inclined to consume too early and have no resources remaining at the end of the 12month period (i.e., squandering) or postpone consumption too much and have an
abundance of resources remaining at the end of the year (i.e., hoarding). Despite these
restrictions, resource allocators demonstrated squandering behavior overall, F (11, 594) =
45.171,/? = .000. Projects were implemented consistently less each month, from a mean
of 3.5 projects in the first month to a mean of 1.69 projects at the end o f the twelfth
month. Moreover, groups and individuals demonstrated different levels of squandering
behavior. As shown in Figure 10, individuals squandered more than groups during the
first six months, but groups squandered away more projects during the last six months, F
(11, 594) = 3.886,/? = .000. The resource-allocation scenario manipulation did not have
an effect on squandering behavior; therefore, the month by scenario interaction was not
significant, F (22, 594) = .389,/? > .05.
Over the 12-month period, participants as a whole squandered their money, F (11,
594) = 33.83,/? = .000, and volunteers, F (11, 594) = 48.933,/? < .001 (see figure 11).
During the first six months, individuals were less conservative than groups, but groups
expended their resources more than individuals during the last six months (see Figure
12). There was a significant difference between group and individual money-squandering
behavior, F (11, 594) = 3.780,/? < .001, and volunteer-squandering behavior, F (11, 594)
= 3.780,/? <.001.
Resource-allocation Behavior
The closer resource allocators are to 100% of z*, the greater level of their
performance on the task. However, the complete assessment of resource-allocation
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behavior cannot be examined exclusively in this particular mathematical form. As
demonstrated earlier, the resource-allocation situation had an effect on performance
because the obtained percentages o f z* differed significantly among groups receiving
dissimilar scenarios. Regardless of the percentage of z* obtained or performance on the
task, behavioral differences in resource-allocation can be revealed. Resource-allocation
behavior is customarily examined by using the graphical solution method. The
illustrations used in the simplex method facilitate the conceptual understanding of
resource-allocation behavior, and differences among comparison groups are visually
depicted.
In previous studies of resource-allocation, differences in behavior were
determined to be the result o f resource changes and fluctuations, and endpoint solutions
(at the end of the year) were interpreted as a percentage o f z* .In the present study o f
resource-allocation, differences in behavior were ascertained by examining various
manipulations o f the situation driving resource-allocation decisions. Endpoints plotted for
each scenario task condition are shown visually in Figure 13. The conceptualization of
these endpoints in a three-dimensional space is imperative because the variability among
these endpoints within and between each condition is determined by how far endpoints
extend down the x- y- and z-axis.
Distributive outcomes. Panel A, Figure 13 is an illustration of the endpoints for
participants who received the Equity scenario. Overall, the ranges o f endpoints (i.e., the
combination of projects implemented to Agraria, the Tech Republic, and Educaland in
one year) extended from 6-16 projects on the x-axis (representing Agraria), 6-18 projects
on the y-axis (representing the Tech Republic), and 2-15 projects on the z-axis
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(representing Educaland). The mean endpoint in the Equity scenario condition was (10,
1 1 , 11 ).

Panel B of Figure 13 shows the endpoints for participants who received the
Equality scenario. The overall ranges of endpoints were narrower than the ranges in the
Equity scenario: 7-16 projects implemented in Agraria, 5-15 projects implemented in the
Tech Republic, and 7-12 projects implemented in Educaland. The mean endpoint in the
Equality scenario condition was (10, 10, 10).
Panel C, Figure 13 exhibits the large variability o f endpoints for participants who
received the Need scenario. Projects implemented in the scenarios ranged from 6-16, 616, and 3-16 in Agraria, the Tech Republic, and Educaland respectively. The mean
endpoint in the Need scenario condition was (12, 9, 9).
Panel D, Figure 13 demonstrates the variability o f endpoints for participants who
received the Different Perspectives scenario. Each member of the group that received this
scenario were advocates for Agraria, Tech Republic, or Educaland, and ranges of projects
for the three countries were 6-14, 7-14, and 5-13 respectively. The mean endpoint for
participants in Different Perspectives scenario condition was (10, 11, 10).
Comparing resource-allocation alternatives. While the graphical method is a
suitable technique to explore resource-allocation behavior (see Figure 14), the differences
among comparison groups can also be examined statistically. Each receiving one o f the
three distributive justice scenarios, groups were compared to individuals on their initial
and final project selections, represented by point (pc, y, z). Initial project implementations
differed significantly between groups and individuals in this 2 (resource allocator type) x
3 (resource-allocation scenario) MANOVA, F (3, 232) = 5.07, p = .002. The mean initial
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project selection was at point (1.48, .8, and .942) for groups and at point (1.77, .892,
1.09) for individuals.
According to the scenario provided, significant differences were found among the
three resource-allocation situations, F (6, 466) = 3.49,/? = .002. Participants’ initial
selections were at point (1.39, 1.04, 1.06) for those who received the Equity scenario, at
point (1.6, .75, 1.13) for those who received the Equality scenario, and at point (1.89, .75,
.862) for those who received the Need scenario.
A significant interaction was found between resource allocator types and scenario
conditions, F (6, 466) = 3.49,/? = .04. While initial project implementation differed
depending on the scenario provided, individuals implemented significantly more projects
in the first month than groups did. When participants reached the final project
implementation period, groups and individuals no longer differed in endpoints. However,
scenarios still had a significant effect on project implementation at Month 12, F (6, 466)
= 11.627,/? = .03.
Final endpoint solutions differed significantly among participants in the resourceallocation scenarios, F(6,466) = 11.627,/? = .000. Participants in the Equity scenario
reached an endpoint o f (11,10,10), and participants reached endpoints o f (10,10,10) and
(12,9,9) in the Equality and Need scenarios respectively.
Over the course of the 12-month resource-allocation task, the trajectory of
behavior changed considerably. The difference between initial implementation point and
final implementation point among groups were significantly different significantly from
these points for individuals, F (1, 234) = 7.05,/? = .008. The initial and final
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implementation points also differed significantly depending on the resource-allocation
scenario, ^ ( l , 234) = 3.224, p = .042.
Equal-scheduling Tendency. The propensity for equal outcomes in resourceallocation behavior has been defined as the equal-scheduling tendency. For example, the
total number of projects implemented to Agraria, Educaland, and the Tech Republic at
the end of the year is equal. In previous two-dimensional resource-allocation problems,
the slope of the line drawn from the origin to the endpoint has determined the equal
scheduling tendency. If the slope is close to +1, then the participant exhibited the equalscheduling tendency. Overall, participants in the present study exhibited the tendency to
distribute projects equally among the three countries, as the average final solution
endpoint was (MA =11, M j = 10 M e = 10). While equal outcomes can be assessed at the
end o f Month 12 by examining slope, the equal-scheduling tendency has not been
examined in the interim, from when the year began and when the year ended. Means of
projects implemented to the three countries were combined at Month 1 and Month 12 to
obtain overall means o f projects distributed over the course of the year (MA = 6.20, ME =
5.28, M t = 5.49). These means for Agraria, Educaland, and the Tech Republic were
significantly different, F (2, 233) = 32.116,/? < .001. The implementation of projects to
Agraria, Educaland, and the Tech Republic changed from Month 1 to Month 12, and this
interaction was significantly different, F (4, 468) = 17.47,/? < .001. Thus, while
participants demonstrated the tendency toward equal outcomes, they did not distribute
projects equally among the three countries consistently throughout the task.
The resource-allocation scenario was a driving force for determining whether or
not to maintain an equal distribution throughout the task. An interaction was found
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between scenario type and project type implemented, F (4, 468) = 17.466,/? < .001.
Participants who received the Need scenario demonstrated behavior most inconsistent
with the equal-scheduling tendency (MA = 7.00, ME = 4.78, M T = 5.01), in comparison to
participants in the Equity scenario {Ma =5.61, M e = 5.61, M j —5.93) and the Equality
scenario {Ma = 5.98, ME = 4.46, M r = 5.54). Moreover, the scenario had an effect on the
implementation of projects to each of the three countries from Month 1 to Month 12, thus
producing a three-way interaction, F (4, 468) = 11.87,/? < .001.

DISCUSSION
In a world where people, time, and money are important and scarce resources,
good resource-allocation decisions are crucial. Efficiency, timeliness, and payoffs are
only a few outcomes that can come from a good resource-allocation decision. However,
what makes a resource-allocation decision a “good” one - a decision where the optimal
IP solution is obtained, where justice is found, where a group is in agreement, where
instructions are followed? Resource-allocation decisions can be based on a multitude of
factors, and many of these factors often occur simultaneously. Resource allocators can
overcome complexity of these decisions, as shown in the performance by many o f the
participants. In this and previous studies on resource-allocation behavior, resourceallocation decisions were assessed on performance (i.e., the percentage o f z* obtained)
and patterns in behavior that develop over time (i.e., plotted with the Graphical Method).
Obtained distribution solutions compared to the normative IP solution
Maximizing or making the most out o f the resources? One example o f a dilemma
faced by product consumers is the decision of whether to buy products in bulk or in
individual packages. When products are purchased in bulk, the enormous quantity of the
product can be overwhelming and may not be completely utilized. However, when
products are purchased in quantities of exact amounts desired, resources are maximized
to their potential. Similar to the consumer’s decision of either buying products in bulk or
in smaller separate quantities, inputs into the present study’s resource-allocation system
involved two types of estimation: (a) resources needed to achieve a maximum number
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projects or (b) the optimal combination of projects that can maximize resources. The
percentage z* obtained was the measurement used to obtain the first type o f estimation
and determined the level of performance. Resource allocators in the Equity scenario
achieved 93% of the optimal IP solution. The performance level o f these resource
allocators was higher than the performance o f resource allocators in all scenarios, or
participants in the Equity scenario implemented more projects that participants in the
other scenarios. Because the Equity scenario invoked a salient rule of maximization, the
observed resource-allocator performance was consistent with this goal of the task. A
cautionary note should be made about the distinction between maximizing projects and
maximizing resources, however. Although participants in the Equity scenario
demonstrated better performance than participants in the other treatment groups, better
performance (obtaining a final endpoint closest to the optimal solution o f (0,9.6,24)) was
not an indication of better resource maximization (obtaining a final endpoint closest to
(16,16,0)). Participants did not make the distinction between the two types o f inputs into
the resource-allocation system.
Obtaining social harmony instead o f the IP solution. In cooperative settings, the
cultivation o f relationships and social harmony are central to making quality decisions. In
the Equality resource-allocation situation, quality decisions are assessed by the fairness of
the distribution. However, decisions based on the resource-allocation problem are
assessed in quantitative terms. Since resource-allocation performance is assessed by z*,
quantity is more relevant than quality in this respect. Participants who received the
Equality scenario obtained 92% of z*. Perhaps sub-optimal performance can be
interpreted by the construed consequences that resource providers would have faced if
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decisions were unjust. While optimal IP solution was attainable, participants made
decisions based on equal distribution outcomes. Equivalent distribution among the three
countries could imply the influence o f two biases that involve either (a) the equalscheduling tendency or (b) the effect of the context presented to the participants. Given
the Equality scenario presented to participants, however, the distinction would be
difficult to make. While the equal-scheduling tendency is commonly used in resourceallocation, participants were also instructed to make equal distributions among the three
countries. Further, while participants in the Equity scenario demonstrated the equalscheduling tendency, resource-allocation behaviors observed in the Need scenario were
driven more by the context than by the equal-scheduling tendency. Hence, performance
by participants in the Equality scenario can be interpreted in two ways depending on
which reference point is used to compare behavior.
Humanitarian considerations vs. rational decision-making. As shown in games
research, the distribution o f resources according to ethical principles does not necessarily
correspond to rational decision criteria (Pepitone, 1971). When all resource recipients are
in disadvantaged positions, it would be morally inappropriate to ignore the needs of
everyone affected by the distributive decisions. Therefore, participants receiving the
Need scenario did not demonstrate optimal performance and perhaps catered to the needs
of the developing countries by obtaining 91% of z*. Although these participants
demonstrated inferior performance compared to other participants who received the other
scenarios, the sub-optimal performance could be a justification for in their resourceallocation situation presented to these participants
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Sacrificing individual goals fo r group goals. Negotiation among groups involves
the maintenance o f personal goals while preserving cooperation to reach agreement
among group members. The attainment o f an optimal solution can be sacrificed when
individuals perceive situations differently and must negotiate their own stake for resource
claims (Hyder, Prietula & Weingart, 2000; White, 1992). Hyder et al., (2000)
demonstrated that some aspects of negotiation inhibit negotiators to achieve optimal
solutions to the problem. Participants in the current study were asked to use
substantiation, or arguments either made to support one’s own position or to attack the
other party’s position in attempt to persuade the other party to shift their position, to
reach a distributive solution. This solution was compared to the optimal IP solution to
obtain 97% of z*. This good though sub-optimal performance might be explained by the
participants’ use o f substantiation in negotiating an overall distributive outcome.
Contexts driving resource-allocation decisions
Particularly from this distributive justice perspective, the thrust behind allocation
decisions does not simply come from resource availability and costs, but emanate from
the contexts in which problems are presented. With multiple constraints or in multiple
dimensions, the resource-allocation problem space is complicated and puzzling enough.
With added situational variables that exceed the frontiers of the problem space, resourceallocation decisions become even thornier, unless direction is provided by the context. By
examining these decisions with a distributive justice agenda, resource allocators can
evaluate the situation in terms of equality, equity, or need and make decisions based on
these principles.
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One o f the new aims of resource-allocation research, therefore, is to disentangle
the knot of key elements (i.e., characteristics of the resource-allocation situation, the
resource allocators, and the problem) that drive distributive decisions. In many resourceallocation studies, performance (i.e., percentage o f z* obtained) has been the primary
variable examined. Perhaps, the observation of general performance is an excessively
myopic research question to consider. Broader aspects of resource-allocation behavior are
emerging out of the current research. Rather than solely examining the question of how
close people are to attainment o f optimal IP solutions, the behavior over time and final
endpoint solutions can be clarified by the situational circumstances in which resource
allocators find themselves. When examined through the lenses of various contexts,
specific behaviors have been identified as manifestations o f distributive justice concerns.
Resource-allocation behaviors can be extricated from contexts facilitating the
interests in economic productivity, positive social relations, and physiological well-being.
These situational variations inherently solicit certain distributive outcomes. Moreover,
the implementation o f various distributive justice principles can be ascertained by the
proximity o f final endpoint solutions in each scenario.
Are resource providers also resource maximizers? Resource allocators who
received the Equity scenario were instructed to maximize their resources o f money and
volunteers and obtained a mean final endpoint o f (10A, 11T, 1 IE). If Equity Subjective
Function were utilized, the optimal solution for this scenario would be at (16^4, 16T, 0E).
While these expected and obtained solutions comprise the same number o f total projects
implemented overall (i.e., 10+11 + 11 = 1 6 + 1 6 + 0 = 32 total projects), there was
money left remaining ($11,200) in the participants’ obtained mean solution. Participants
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did not completely expend all their resources to obtain the optimal solution (where $0.00
and zero volunteers are left remaining). Resources that were not consumed were left as
waste and could not be salvaged once the year terminated. Therefore, resource allocators
in the Cost-effective scenario did not behave as directed by their Subjective Function to
utilize all resources available.
The most apparent explanation for the discrepancy between the expected solution
and the obtained solution was that the equal-scheduling tendency was followed. Resource
allocators who received the Equity scenario nearly balanced project implementations in
Agraria, Educaland, and the Tech Republic. This behavior is similar to previous resourceallocation studies where participants exemplified the use of the equal-scheduling
tendency. Equal distribution is not only a simple cognitive heuristic to use, but it also
develops as a guard for uncertainty. Financial consultants and stockbrokers, for example,
typically advise clients to “diversify” portfolios to protect themselves from losses that can
potentially be incurred if individual market sectors take a downward turn. Likewise, the
implications for ignoring the needs of the three deprived countries might be greater than
the repercussions for inefficiently allocating resources.
The politics involved in some resource-allocation decisions can weigh on the
conscience of resource providers as they seek consistency with standards o f the social or
organizational environment (Surazska, 1986). The resource-allocation process does not
end once a decision is made; decisions are evaluated by the recipients, superiors, and the
public in general. Should resource providers ignore the needs o f Educaland, simply
because resources will be maximized if a certain solution (i.e., (16^4, 167", 0E)) is
obtained? Perhaps the equal distribution of implemented projects was a result of a
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diplomatic decision, rather than a futile attempt at maximizing resources. Nonetheless, in
the Equity scenario, resource providers chose to be sensitive to rather than to ignore each
of the countries’ needs (including Educaland’s).
Resource providers given the Equity scenario were provided with limited
information regarding the status of the countries. This procedure was executed to ensure
that participants would base decisions more on resource properties than the needs o f the
countries. However, an incomplete depiction of the resource-allocation situation could
also warrant the use o f the equality heuristic, which is a quick and easy cognitive shortcut
to carry out.
A context that justifies the equal-scheduling tendency. The equal distribution of
TEA Corps projects among recipients exists as a fairness heuristic that resource providers
can rely on without trouble. Resource allocators who received the Equality scenario were
instructed to meet the requests of Agraria, Educaland, and the Tech Republic. In so
doing, participants reached their goal to maximize the number of projects possible, while
maintaining an equal proportion of projects implemented. They obtained a mean final
endpoint o f (KM, 10r, IKE'), which is the optimal solution consistent with the details
provided in the Equality scenario.
As an organization that provides financial aid and manpower assistance, the TEA
Corps must make decisions with objectivity and impartiality. While Agraria, Educaland,
and the Tech Republic each have their own state-of-affairs, the Equality scenario directed
resource providers to regard each country as equivalents and legitimize the needs of each
country. With the given instructions, equalizing project implementations among the three
countries appears to be an effortless task; balanced outcomes are easily achieved.
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Anomalous behaviors were observed, however. Resource-allocation behavior still
varied among resource providers in the Equality scenario, despite its explicit instructions
to maintain a neutral stance. Variability among resource allocators can be accounted for
by examining resource-allocation behavior at each year. Participants were aware that new
project implementations recurred every year and that resources were refreshed to their
initial amounts once the computer program completed one cycle. A few participants
demonstrated variability in their project distribution in the first year (e.g., (15^4, 8T, 8E)),
switched the direction o f distribution the following year (e.g., (8A, 15 J, 8E)), and so
forth. Projects were not always implemented equally during a given year, but participants
who managed the problem in this way eventually balanced overall outcomes by the time
they finished with the fourth year of the task.
Addressing the concern fo r humanitarian action. As members o f a charitable
organization and characterized as compassionate, benevolent human beings, TEA Corps
Project Managers had control and authority over the implementation o f the projects. It
was up to the resource provider’s prerogative to allocate resources based on their own set
of standards or conditions. It was expected that resource providers would view Agraria as
the most disadvantaged o f the three countries. Evident in the final distribution outcomes
of project implementation, participants in the Need scenario found that the (12^4, 97, 9E)
IP solution was the proper response to the distributive justice principle o f need. The
marked asymmetry in the solution is an indication that project directors distinguished the
special needs of Agraria from the needs of the other countries. Agraria endures a more
brutal class of penury — starvation — in comparison with the Tech Republic’s need for
technological advancements and Educaland’s need for acceptable learning environments.
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Although participants could have taken a more disproportionate venture (i.e., by
obtaining a solution of (244, 0T, OE)), participants who received the Need scenario
remained sensitive to the needs of the other two countries. Hence, resource providers
made decisions more moderate than was expected (i.e., according to a Rawlsian (1971)
perspective for improving the situation of those worse off) and did not obtain the IP
solution directed by their Subjective Function.
Sub-optimal behavior, as observed in the Need scenario, can be explained by the
potential accountability that people face when making judgments and decisions. In social
and organizational environments, the goals that steer the decision-making derive from the
motivation to enhance one’s social image and to maintain the approval and respect for
others (Tetlock, 1985). Moreover, decision-makers take explicit responsibility for the
welfare of others and enforce their own political ideologies (Clayton, 2000; Mannix et al.,
1995; Rasinski, 1987). As authoritative figures with control over the welfare o f three
developing countries, project directors considered each issue in its own right. Although
the conditions were relatively more deprived in one country than the other two, the
overall concern for distributive justice cannot be disregarded because the integrity o f the
TEA Corps organization could be challenged. If resource providers implemented projects
only in Agraria, would the citizens of Educaland and the Tech Republic be tolerant of this
decision? Although the severity of Agraria’s plight extended to health and physical well
being, there was also a sense of responsibility to meet the requests of other countries.
Therefore, participants who received the Need scenario took on a genteel perspective of
the situation by distributing resources to all three alternatives, rather than obtaining an
All-and-Nothing solution, where Agraria would receive all TEA Corps projects. Hence,

60
morally appropriate criteria were used for the distribution outcome because all countries
deserved consideration, and this context emphasized the minimization of suffering in
general.
Justifying one’s deservingness in relation to others. The distribution of goods in
society has been concerned with the recipient’s responses to injustice or inequality. Early
social justice research (e.g., Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) heralded the interest of perceived
fairness of distributive outcomes and reaction to these outcomes. Fairness judgments are
often evaluated on the social level, rather than on the individual level, by comparing
one’s relative standing against another’s (Festinger, 1954). When individuals in groups
use one another as a measuring stick for social comparison, they are particularly sensitive
to the notion of injustice, a feeling that consequently provokes dissatisfaction with or
antipathy for the distributive outcomes. Blatant inequality in the distribution share
warrants social comparison judgments of deservingness. Most of the theoretical
underpinnings o f social comparison processes have focused on various dimensions such
as abilities and opinions; however, comparison judgments o f deservingness in the context
of distributive justice have tapped little into research and theory (Bazerman et al., 1995;
Masters & Smith, 1987), and have not been addressed in resource-allocation behavior.
To some extent, compliance with the benchmarks of fairness stems from the need
to perceive oneself as a deserving person (Reis, 1981). Presented with information
regarding their respective country, Agraria, Educaland, and Tech Republic delegates
contended for TEA Corps project implementation: Agraria delegates maintained that the
health of their citizens was at stake; Educaland delegates declared the need for securing
the intellectual well-being o f their children; and the Tech Republic delegates upheld their
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case for advancing industrial interests. As advocates, each delegate claimed deserved
consideration for the implementation o f projects. As a conglomerate, however, the group
was charged with the responsibility for negotiating outcomes with their counterparts.
Overall, the group consensus was to distribute projects evenly among the three countries.
Resource allocators took on different perspectives of the situation and settled on the
distribution o f 11 projects to Agraria, and 10 projects each to Educaland and the Tech
Republic. Two conclusions can be derived from these results. Perhaps the needs of these
countries were equally deserving and defensible in regards to the receipt o f aid from the
TEA Corps organization. Alternatively, cooperation in reaching a consensus may have
taken precedence over engaging in a prolonged dispute. While the former explanation
serves as a manipulation check on deservingness among the three countries, the later
account epitomizes the means by which groups typically reach decisions.
Justice judgments from the decision-maker’s perspective
Business managers, social service workers, and university administrators alike
have goals to maximize the productivity within the organization for which they manage
while maintaining a positive, cooperative environment. The suitable approach for
distributive decisions made by authoritative figures in organizational environments would
include the merging of equity, equality, and need (Mannix, Neal & Northcraft, 1995;
Tyler & Griffin, 1991). The three types o f distributive justice do not always emerge as
distinct entities and cannot be extricated easily from most situations and social contexts.
These principles are often observed as a composite o f fairness issues, and the differing
yet interacting goal options (e.g., maintain equity while remain compassionate for the
needy) are difficult to balance. Although the major difficulty is that group members must
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agree upon an acceptable distribution norm (Mannix et al., 1995), authorities can identify
the positive outcomes for making allocation decisions by means of fair procedures (Tyler
& Griffin, 1991).
Fairness judgments over time
Distributive outcomes are generally examined once a final decision is made.
However, one of the advantages of research in resource-allocation behavior is that
fairness judgments can be assessed and compared at many points in time. In the current
study, distributions were observed on a monthly and yearly basis. From the incremental
surveillance of behavior, final IP endpoints determine final distributive outcomes.
Participants did not always behave consistently throughout the task. Their overall
behavior assessed at each month demonstrated squandering, and even more so for
individuals than groups (contrary to the risky-shift phenomenon). When behavior was
examined after each year, however, there were no significant changes in distributive
outcomes overall. Bazerman et al. (1995) emphasized that discrepancy between one-at-a
time evaluations (i.e., take-it-or-leave-it) and comparative evaluations o f fairness have
ecological ramifications. How assertive or impulsive must one be to make proper
judgments o f fairness? While iterative tasks (one-time decisions) were not compared to
dynamic tasks (decisions over time) in the current study, previous research in resourceallocation behavior indicate that there could be differences (i.e., learning effects).
Future distributive justice considerations in group resource-allocation behavior
It would be an intuitive assumption that resource allocators working in groups
will encounter more difficulty in implementing distribution rules than individual resource
allocators if allocation goals were not made explicit. Processing the information and
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making fairness judgments is a complex task. Compounded with idiosyncratic
approaches and judgments from other individuals in the group, the difficulty of the task is
even more amplified. Decisions by groups trying to reach agreements on distribution
rules to employ can also be hampered by unspecific guidelines for distribution (Mannix
et al., 1995). Therefore, it was necessary to provide participants with a “frame of mind”
for the resource-allocation task.
Derived from each of the scenarios implying various distribution norms, resourceallocation situations could be assessed independently of the resource-allocation problem
itself. Similar to the findings of Harris and Joyce (1980), participants have a tendency to
differentiate between the allocation of expenses and the allocation of outcomes.
However, the results of current study indicate that participants preferred to make
resource-allocation decisions based on the distributive outcomes than based on resource
properties (i.e., availability, costs, etc.). Perhaps the distributive outcomes are more
salient that quantifiable aspects of the resources. This cognitive tendency can be further
examined in resource-allocation behavior by manipulating the inputs (e.g., projects vs.
resource amounts) into the resource-allocation system.
Competing concerns in resource-allocation
Notions of distributive justice, as investigated in the present study, were
conceptualized as independent allocation schemes and have been examined separately
throughout the distributive justice literature (e.g., Boldero & Rosenthal, 1980; Deutsch,
1975; Mannix et al., 1994; Walster et al., 1976). However, the resource-allocation
behavior of participants indicates that they were aware that various allocation procedures
could be implemented to obtain a satisfying solution. None o f the resource allocators
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diverged to any complete extreme (e.g., obtaining a distribution solution o f (0, 9, 24)),
even when the resource-allocation problem necessitated that one of the seven IP solutions
must be obtained to achieve maximization. While the results indicate that they were
swayed by the imposed context in which the problem was presented, there was not much
variability in their obtained solutions, in relation to the vast feasible region where
hundreds of solutions were possible. The uniformity in behavior can be attributed to the
competing concerns o f equality, equity, and need, the three components o f distributive
justice that are conceptually different but difficult to examine discretely. An attractive
facet o f resource-allocation behavior is that inputs into the system are easily assessed and
that distributive rules can be interpreted from the final solutions obtained. Therefore, the
complexity o f resource-allocation analysis is mitigated by the behaviors that emerge from
the three distribution norms.
Extrapolating from unique distributive justice conditions
By examining allocation decisions with a distributive justice framework, the
situational variables surrounding resource-allocation problems can be identified. What
makes resource allocators inspect the problem space in the way they do? The manner in
which the problem is presented and how the situation is depicted considerably accounts
for variability in behavioral patterns (Harris & Joyce, 1980). As observed in the present
study, contextual manipulation allows researchers to control for environmental aspects
driving specific types of resource distribution. Distribution of resources, however, should
also be examined outside of the laboratory. In natural settings, resource providers
understand the importance of justice to the recipients and actively mold their allocation
policies to conform to distributive justice principles (Lemer & Lemer, 1981). Some
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researchers have argued that issues of distributive justice should be examined according
to the extent to which the principles are defined by resource allocators, rather than by the
observation of how people react to the principles under various circumstances (Tyler &
Griffin, 1991).
The empirical work on distributive justice has taken an approach to examine
fairness judgments on the part of the provider and recipient independently. By
investigating distributive justice as a broader concept, the interaction between fairness
judgments from the perspectives o f both the provider and recipient can better determine
the source of distributive outcomes. For example, the integrity o f decisions made by the
provider (e.g., a social worker) is evaluated based on the best interests of the recipients
(e.g., orphaned children). Considering fairness judgments on the part of the providers
and perceptions o f the recipients simultaneously can further expand distributive justice
research.
Conclusions
What was once a well-defined research-allocation problem has now become an
ill-defined distributive justice problem. The frontiers of resource-allocation research are
expanding beyond the examination of resource fluctuations and properties. Various
allocation schemes that have long been identified in the distributive justice literature are
finally emerging as interpretations for resource-allocation behavior. The current research
demonstrated that distributive justice issues can have a bearing on resource-allocation
performance. More importantly, contexts were shown to affect judgments profoundly.
The resource-allocation contexts and situations as presented in this study specifically
focused on distributive justice issues, and it is also acknowledged that circumstances in
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which people make resource-allocation decisions are not solely based on fairness issues
or distributions among resource recipients.
Based on the present research investigation in resource-allocation behavior, it can
be concluded that resource providers will be able to pick up on clues from the resourceallocation environment and follow instructions; they will be able to determine which
resource-allocation scheme is best to use; they are able to distinguish these resourceallocation schemes whether in groups or as individuals; and they obtain a distribution
outcome that will be “fair” according to the resource-allocation situation.
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TABLE 1
Experimental Design of Three-dimensional Resource-allocation Problem_______
Distributive Justice Scenario
Other Scenario
________________ Equity
Equality
Need
Different Perspectives
Project Sources
3
3
3
3
Number o f Months

12

12

12

12

Possible Projects

5

5

5

5

Number o f Years

4

4

4

4

Individual

10

10

10

3-Person Group

10

10

10

Participants

10
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TABLE 2
_______ Money and Volunteers Required to Implement Each TEA Corps Project
_____________________ Resources_____________
___________________________________ Money__________________ Volunteers
Tech Republic
$8000
15
Educaland
$4800
24
Agraria_____________________________ $4000_____________________ 30
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Resource-allocation problems can be presented in multiple dimensions. In a
three-dimensional problem, each dimension represents a decision variable on the x-, y-, or
z-axis. Resource constraints are represented by three-dimensional planes (x-, y-plane; y-,
z-plane; x-, y-plane), which determine the boundaries o f the feasible region. Any point
can be satisfied in this feasible region that is restricted by the shaded resource-constraint
planes. The “most attractive comer,” is a maximum point in the feasible region that can
be satisfied within the resource-constraints and represents the optimal solution if the goal
of the resource allocator is to maximize payoffs.
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Figure Caption
Figure 2. Resource-allocation task objectives are defined by the objective function. The
objective function operates as a resource-allocation guide for communicating task goals
(i.e., maximize the number of projects that can be implemented in one year). Objective
and subjective functions are determined by the resource-allocation schemes that help
resource allocators achieve optimal solutions. The objective and subjective function
planes seen here are illustrated falling outside the 3-D feasible regions but should not be
conceptualized as such. Panel A shows the objective function plane representing a
resource-allocation scheme leading to the optimal LP solution (0, 9.6, 24). Panel B shows
the subjective function plane representing a resource-allocation scheme leading to the
optimal solution (16, 16, 0) for the Equity Scenario. Panel C shows the subjective
function plane representing a resource-allocation scheme leading to the optimal solution
(10, 10, 10) for the Equality Scenario. Panel D shows the subjective function plane
representing a resource-allocation scheme leading to the optimal solution (24,0,0) for the
Need Scenario.
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Figure Caption
Figure 3. Resource-constraint planes are plotted in the three-dimensional space. The
objective of the task was to maximize the number of projects possible to implement in
one year when provided with a budget of $192,000 and 720 TEA Corps volunteers.
Resource amounts and expenses of each TEA Corps project can be expressed in equation
form, which can be represented graphically. The x-, y-plane represents the possible
combinations o f Agraria and Tech Republic projects within the feasible region. All
possible combinations o f Tech Republic and Educaland projects are represented by they, z-plane, and the x-, z- plane can be used to determine the number of combinations
possible for Agraria and Educaland projects.
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Figure Caption
Figure 4. Linear and Integer Programming techniques to solve resource-allocation
problems can be used to determine normative solutions. In most Linear Programming
problems, there is only one optimum solution, whereas multiple optimal solutions may be
possible in Integer programming. The LP optimal solution is (0, 9.6, 24). Seven optimal
IP solutions in the resource-allocation problem are (0, 8, 25); (0, 9, 24); (0, 10, 23); (1, 9,
23); (1, 10, 22); (1, 11,21); and (2, 9, 22). All IP solutions represent possible
combinations of projects implemented to the Tech Republic, Educaland, and Agraria to
achieve the maximum number of projects possible (i.e., 33) given the resourceconstraints.

O ptim al LP S o lu t io

77
Figure Caption
Figure 5. Objective and subjective function planes are represented in a three-dimensional
space. These planes represent the orientation that the resource allocator takes. The
objective and subjective function planes seen here are illustrated falling outside the 3-D
feasible regions but should not be conceptualized as such. Panel A illustrates the
objective function plane. With the goal to maximize the number of TEA Corps projects,
resource allocators utilize the objective function that represents an allocation scheme
leading to the Optimal LP or IP solutions as illustrated in Figure 4. Panel B illustrates the
Equality Scenario subjective function. With the goal to equalize the number of projects
implemented in the Tech Republic, Educaland, and Agraria, resource allocators utilize
the Equality Scenario subjective function that represents an allocation scheme leading to
their optimal solution of (10, 10, 10). Panel C illustrates the Equity subjective function.
With the goal to maximize resources, resource allocators utilize the Equity Scenario
subjective function that represents an allocation scheme leading their optimal solution of
(16, 16, 0). Panel D illustrates the Need Scenario subjective function. With the goal to
maximize the number of projects implemented in Agraria, resource allocators utilize the
Need Scenario subjective function that leads to their optimal solution of (24, 0, 0).
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Figure Caption
Figure 6. When a group of resource allocators take different perspectives, each resource
allocator possesses his or her own subjective orientations. The Subjective Function
Planes lead to extreme points in the feasible region. The trajectory of the Subjective
Function Plane for Tech Republic delegates leads to their optimal solution of (0, 24, 0).
Educaland delegates have a Subjective Function Plane that has the trajectory leading to
the optimal solution of (0, 0, 30). The Subjective Function Plane for Agraria delegates
has a trajectory that leads to the optimal solution of (24, 0, 0).
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Figure Caption
Figure 7. Contexts in which the resource-allocation problem is presented had an effect on
performance. General aspects of the distributive justice principles o f equity, equality, and
need were the topic in the scenarios. Observed totals of the number of projects
implemented were compared to 33, the maximum number of projects possible in one
year. Participants in each resource-allocation scenario obtained a percentage of z*, which
was the measurement used to evaluate performance. Participants who received the Equity
scenario obtained an approximate mean of 93% of z*, while participants who received
the Equality and Need scenarios achieved slightly over 92% and 91% o f z*, respectively.
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Figure Caption
Figure 8. Themes of distributive justice principles were presented in the Equity, Equality,
and Need resource-allocation scenarios. The contexts embedded in the resourceallocation problem had a significant effect on the maximization of money, but not on
volunteers. Participants were provided with $192,000 at the beginning of each year and
made allocations every month. At the end of the year, participants in the Equity scenario
utilized close to 91% of all their money. In the Equality scenario, participants consumed
approximately 89% o f their money, and 86% o f the initial money amount was consumed
by participants who received the Need scenario.
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Figure Caption
Figure 9. With a budget of $192,000, participants not only differed in their consumption
of money in each resource-allocation scenario, but also differed in their allocations across
four trials (i.e., years). Overall, participants learned to utilize more money each year.
Participants in the Equity scenario progressed from maximizing approximately 90% of
their resources in the first year to 92% by the fourth year. The range was smaller for
participants in the Equality scenario, where they consumed 91% of their resources in the
first year and 92% on the fourth year. Participants in the Need scenario did not consume
as much money as participants in the two other scenarios, but this context facilitated
more learning. They utilized approximately 84% of their resources in the first year, and
utilized slightly over 87% of the money in the fourth year.
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Figure Caption
Figure 10. Over the course of a year, participants implemented TEA Corps projects more
aggressively at the beginning o f the year and left fewer projects to be implemented at the
end of the year. With a provision that a minimum of one project and a maximum o f five
projects that can be implemented each month, participants demonstrated squandering
behavior across all four years that the task was presented. This figure illustrates these
dissimilarities in squandering. Individuals implemented an average of 3.8 projects on the
first month and an average of 1.5 projects on the last month. Implementation rate for
groups was more gradual included an average of 3.2 projects on the first month and an
average of 1.9 projects on the last month.
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Figure Caption
Figure 11. Money and volunteers were resources used to implement projects every
month. Participants were provided with $192,000 and 720 volunteers at the beginning of
each year and made allocations each month. They could have utilized resources at an
even rate, but participants squandered both their resources throughout the year. Based on
the percentage of resources consumed, participants utilize more volunteers as compared
to money. On the first month, participants utilized approximately 12% of their allotted
volunteers, compared to 10% of the money allotted. By the twelfth month, the rate at
which participants consumed resources converged. Participants consumed 5% o f both
volunteers and money on the last month.
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Figure Caption
Figure 12. Squandering behavior (i.e., consuming resources early and leaving fewer
resources to be consumed by the year’s end) was observed across all four years.
Individuals and three-person groups demonstrated differing squandering behavior.
Individuals sharply consumed resources at the beginning in the year and left fewer
resources towards the end of the year. In contrast, groups squandered their resources at a
gradual rate. Panel A illustrates money consumption rates for individuals and groups over
the course o f a year. Individuals consumed about 10% of their money in the first month
and consumed slightly more than 4% in the last month. Groups consumed money at a rate
of almost 9% at the first of the year and consumed at a rate of 6% at the end. Panel B
illustrates the rate in which individuals and groups utilized volunteers over a year.
Individuals utilized 13% of the number of volunteers available at the beginning of the
year and almost 5% at the end of the year. Groups permitted 11% of volunteers to be
utilized in the first month and approximately 6% in the last month.
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Figure Caption
Figure 13. Panel A is an illustration of the endpoint solutions at the conclusion of each
year for participants who received the Equity scenario. Overall, the ranges of endpoints
(i.e., the combination of projects implemented to Agraria, the Tech Republic, and
Educaland in one year) extended from 6-16 projects on the x-axis (representing Agraria),
6-18 projects on they-axis (representing the Tech Republic), and 2-15 projects on the zaxis (representing Educaland). Panel B shows the endpoints for participants that received
the Equality scenario. The overall ranges o f endpoints were narrower than the ranges in
the Equity scenario: 7-16 projects implemented in Agraria, 5-15 projects implemented in
the Tech Republic, and 7-12 projects implemented in Educaland. Panel C exhibits the
large variability of endpoints for participants that received the Need scenario. Projects
implemented in the scenarios ranged from 6-16, 6-16, and 3-16 in Agraria, the Tech
Republic, and Educaland respectively. Panel D demonstrates the variability of endpoints
for participants that received the Different Perspectives scenario. Each individual
member of the group that received this scenario was an advocate for Agraria, Tech
Republic, or Educaland, and ranges of projects for the three countries were 6-14, 7-14,
and 5-13 respectively.
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Figure Caption
Figure 14. Resource-allocation behavior can differ from situation to situation, even
though the same resource-allocation problem is presented. Panel A graphically represents
the graphical behavior when the Equity scenario was given. On the first month, resource
allocators chose to implement a (1, 1, 1) combination of projects, where x, y, z represent
Agraria, Tech Republic, and Educaland, respectively. By the twelfth month, resource
allocators implemented (10, 11, 11) combination. Panel B represents the graphical
behavior when the Equality scenario was given. On the first month, resource allocators
implemented a (2, 1, 1) combination of projects and equalized project implementations
by the twelfth month to obtain a (10, 10, 10) solution. Panel C represents the graphical
behavior of resource allocators when the Need scenario was presented. Resource
allocators began their distribution on the first month with a (2, 1, 1) combination and
maintained unbalanced distribution throughout the year to obtain a (12, 9, 9) combination
of projects implemented on the twelfth month. Panel D represents the graphical behavior
of a group of resource allocators given different perspectives. The group approached the
task aggressively and began the year with a (2, 2, 1) combination but mitigated behavior
by obtaining a (10, 11, 10) combination by the end of the year.
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APPENDIX
A ll Participants Received the Following:
The TEA Corps is a non-profit organization that supports underdeveloped countries in the areas
of technology, education, and agriculture. As the TEA Corps Director(s) of Project
Management, you are in charge o f allocating the organization's resources. Your decisions are
critical because they influence not only you and your organization, but also the livelihood of
underdeveloped countries in the world. The TEA Corps provides two resources-volunteers and
money-for aiding countries in need. Members of the TEA Corps go to these countries and
volunteer their manpower according to the need o f a country. There are 720 volunteers who are
trained in technology, education, and agriculture and are equipped to put these projects into
action. Money is another resource needed for these operations. The TEA Corps receives
donations, all of which go to these projects. They have a yearly budget of $192,000. At the
beginning of each month, the TEA Corps implements new projects and completes these projects
by the end of each month. The TEA Corps provides aid for three underdeveloped countries:
Tech Republic, Educaland, and Agraria.
Each Participant Read One o f the Following Scenarios:
Equity Scenario
Each country has its own needs; therefore, resource-allocation requirements for each project
differ from country to country. No country is looked upon more favorably than another; your
decision is based strictly on the resources that your organization has and the required resources
for each project. The resources required to implement one project in each country are described
below:
• Every technological project will help the Tech Republic with computers, healthcare, and
industrial equipment. Each projects requires 15 volunteers and $8000 to implement.
• Every educational project will help Educaland with the building of schoolhouses,
teaching materials, and books. Each project requires 24 volunteers and $4800 to
implement.
• Every agricultural project will help Agraria with planting crops, irrigation, and
equipment. Each project requires 30 volunteers and $4000 to implement.
Your responsibility is to be objective in your decision-making and to maximize all the resources
that the TEA Corps provides to implement these projects (720 volunteers and the budget of
$192,000 per year). As you allocate these resources, you must adhere to restrictions of
implementing a minimum of 1 project and a maximum of 5 projects per month, for 12 months.
At the end of each year, the computer program will reset your resources to the initial amounts.
Proceed with each new year until the computer program ends. According to the information
provided in this scenario, take the perspective of the TEA Corps Director(s) of Project
Management and maximize the number of volunteers and money provided.
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Equality Scenario
Each country has its own needs; therefore, resource-allocation requirements for each project
differ from country to country. The resources required to implement one project in each country
are described below:
• Every technological project will help the Tech Republic with computers, healthcare, and
industrial equipment. Each projects requires 15 volunteers and $8000 to implement.
• Every educational project will help Educaland with the building of schoolhouses,
teaching materials, and books. Each project requires 24 volunteers and $4800 to
implement.
• Every agricultural project will help Agraria with planting crops, irrigation, and
equipment. Each project requires 30 volunteers and $4000 to implement.
You would like to see all three countries benefit from what the TEA Corps has to offer. No
country is looked upon more favorably than another because each country has its own legitimate
needs:
• Tech Republic requests help technology. This country believes that they are ready to
increase technology. This country does not have the basic know-how to begin
technological advancements. The Tech Republic wants to thrive technologically.
• Educaland requests help in education. The literacy rate is quite low. The country falls
below minimum standards for proper education. Educalanders cannot afford to go to
school.
• Agraria requests help in agriculture. This country has suffered a drought for many years.
This country is very poor. People are starving in Agraria.
You would like to meet the requests of all three countries as much as possible, with the given
resources that you have. You must remain neutral in your decision-making as you assign
projects to these countries. As you allocate these resources, you must adhere to restrictions of
implementing a minimum of 1 project and a maximum of 5 projects per month, for 12 months.
At the end of each year, the computer program will reset your resources to the initial amounts.
Proceed with each new year until the computer program ends. According to the information
provided in this scenario, take the perspective of an impartial TEA Corps Director(s) of Project
Management and delegate project responsibilities to your volunteers within the financial budget
you have.
Need Scenario
Each country has its own needs; therefore, resource-allocation requirements for each project
differ from country to country. The resources required to implement one project in each country
are described below:
• Every technological project will help the Tech Republic with computers, healthcare, and
industrial equipment. Each project requires 15 volunteers and $8000 to implement.
• Every educational project will help Educaland with the building of schoolhouses,
teaching materials, and books. Each project requires 24 volunteers and $4800 to
implement.
• Every agricultural project will help Agraria with planting crops, irrigation, and
equipment. Each project requires 30 volunteers and $4000 to implement.
Each country has its own legitimate needs:
• Tech Republic requests help technology
• Educaland requests help in education
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• Agraria requests help in agriculture
Agraria is a country that has suffered a drought for decades. This country is very poor,
and many people starve with hunger in Agraria. Although the Tech Republic and
Educaland have their own needs, you are aware that Agraria is in greater desperation for
your help. As the Director of Project Management, you have the power to provide
Agraria with tremendous relief, and you would like to see Agraria benefit from what the
TEA Corps has to offer. As you allocate these resources, you must adhere to restrictions
of implementing a minimum of 1 project and a maximum of 5 projects per month, for 12
months. At the end of each year, the computer program will reset your resources to the
initial amounts. Proceed with each new year until the computer program ends.
According to the information provided in this scenario, take the perspective of a
sympathetic TEA Corps Director(s) of Project Management and delegate project
responsibilities to your volunteers within the financial budget you have.
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